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Stability, Asymmetry, and
Discontinuity: The Launch of
European Monetary Union
ALTHOUGH STILL LESS than one year old as this volume goes to press, Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is already under trial, charged
with at least three offenses. The first is false advertising: Europeans, it is
claimed, did not get the strong, stable currency they were promised, for
within seven months of its birth the euro had lost 13.5 percent of its value
against the dollar. The second is obfuscation: markets are finding the sig-
nals from the new monetary institutions confusing and inconsistent, and a
scarcity of relevant information—from delays in releasing reliable euro
area–wide statistics to lack of access to the deliberations of the Governing
Council—makes it difficult to forecast economic developments and to
understand the policy conduct of the new European Central Bank (ECB).
The third is lack of impartiality: the ECB’s new policies are claimed to be
exacerbating asymmetries between fast-growing and slow-growing coun-
tries and validating the presumption that the costs and beneﬁts of monetary
cohabitation are unfairly distributed among small and large member states. 
This paper espouses a rather different thesis. In terms of its impact on
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08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 295cyclical contingencies, EMU is performing well above expectations. And
it is doing so even though persistent asymmetries across countries repre-
sent a threat to the ability of the new policy framework to guarantee eco-
nomic stability and promote further integration in Europe. It is clearly
premature to attempt even a first assessment of the new European mone-
tary architecture—it will take quite a few years before the track record of
the ECB becomes sufficiently long and rich for such an evaluation. This
paper is instead devoted to the more modest task of casting light on early
developments in the euro area and their potential implications for the
future of EMU, surveying the main points in the current debate, noting
contrasting positions, and evaluating those positions in light of the avail-
able evidence. Our synthetic but comprehensive overview of the first few
months in the life of the euro is thus aimed at disentangling those facts,
empirical evidence, and institutional details that we consider useful toward
a balanced interpretation of the current monetary and ﬁnancial evolution in
Europe. 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by placing our analysis of
the swift launch of the euro in the context of the macroeconomic conver-
gence and integration that took place in Europe following the 1992–93 cri-
sis of the European Monetary System (EMS). We then discuss the
monetary strategies of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),
reviewing the ofﬁcial positions taken and the main criticisms leveled in the
recent debate. Next we focus on the instruments of monetary policy in
the euro area and on liquidity management and money market integra-
tion. We then present an update of developments in the bond and equity
markets and a preliminary assessment of public debt management strate-
gies by the eleven independent sovereign states coexisting in the euro area.
We go on to deal with some open issues in the euro area banking sector,
comment on the behavior of the euro in the currency markets, and ana-
lyze asymmetries across European regions and their implications for cen-
tralized monetary policy. Finally, we review the process of fiscal
consolidation and the debate on the code of budgetary discipline in
Europe.
1
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1. Although extensive, this list of topics is certainly not exhaustive. For a wider win-
dow on the EMU debate and an update of the information presented in this paper, see the
contributions available online on the website “Euro Economic Sources: Economic Policies
in the EMU,” maintained by Giancarlo Corsetti at www.econ.yale.edu/~corsetti/euro/.
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From a technical standpoint, the euro was born on December 31, 1998.
That was the date when the fixed conversion rates among euro area cur-
rencies were determined, and thus when the national currencies were
demoted to nondecimal denominations of the new currency.
2 It was also
the start of the changeover weekend, during which clearing and settle-
ment systems were retooled and trading positions and accounts redenom-
inated from the old currencies into euros. The euro’s birth itself was almost
a nonevent. Even ECB President Wim Duisenberg felt compelled to
observe that the decision “turned out to be almost a formality—different
from what many of us might have expected barely a year ago.”
3
What might have gone wrong at the euro’s launch? One danger was that
the values of the national currencies might have become misaligned in
the months preceding its birth. As established by the European Council
meeting in Madrid in December 1995, the euro replaced the European cur-
rency unit (ECU) at the rate of one euro for one ECU. Thus the value of the
euro coincided with the value of the basket of currencies in the ECU, val-
ued at market rates on December 31, 1998. Meanwhile, with the goal of
providing a clear signal to the markets, bilateral parities for the eleven cur-
rencies in the euro had already been set and announced on May 1998, after
the determination of the initial membership in EMU. In the few months
before EMU’s takeoff, some commentators expressed concern over the
possibility of divergences between the preannounced rates and market
rates, reflecting speculative attacks or insufficient monetary cooperation
among national central banks, or both.
4
Also, during the conversion weekend the complexity of the operations
and the tight timetable (from the fixing of euro rates, announced at
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2. The locking in of exchange rates represents the first step toward full monetary inte-
gration. For three years beginning in 1999, all money values in the euro area will be
expressed either in euros or in national currency on a voluntary basis. Euro notes and coins
will be introduced on January 1, 2002. Between that date and June 30, 2002, both euros
and national currencies will circulate in parallel. After June 30, 2002, national notes and
coins will be exchangeable only at banks. The possibility of shortening the period of paral-
lel circulation is under discussion at the time of this writing. 
3. Wim Duisenberg, statement at the joint press conference following the Ecofin meet-
ing, Brussels, December 31, 1998.
4. See the discussion in Obstfeld (1998a, 1998b) and Centre for Economic Policy
Research (1997).
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uary 4, 1999) represented a potential source of systemwide risk. EU con-
tingency plans, ranging from special authority to exclude unprepared
agents from market operations to the introduction of special monetary pol-
icy procedures, had been designed to deal with possible market anom-
alies.
5 But contrary to the prognostications of some euroskeptics, the
outset of EMU was almost glitch-free. The euro currencies remained
closely aligned for months, making the December 31 fixing a mere vali-
dation of the status quo. No contingency plan was activated. The new
payments system of EMU, called TARGET (for Trans-European Auto-
mated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer), exhibited from the
very start a high degree of technical reliability.
6
What is truly remarkable about the birth of the euro is not only the
smoothness of its delivery, but also the fact that its eight-year gestation did
not break away from the timetable and procedures agreed upon in Decem-
ber 1991 at Maastricht. Recall that, just a few months after the drafting of
the Maastricht Treaty, the EMS suffered the deepest and longest crisis in
its history, generating widespread skepticism about the prospects for Euro-
pean policy cooperation and monetary integration.
7 At the time, many
believed that the EMU project would be postponed, or at best start out as
a greater deutsche mark area, as even the participation of France was in
doubt. 
In historical perspective, the odds for a successful achievement of EMU
were largely set by the policy and institutional response to the 1992–93
crisis. That crisis was rooted in an unresolved policy conﬂict between Ger-
many and the rest of the system on how to deal with growing price and out-
put asymmetries across countries, related both to the shock of German
uniﬁcation and to the cumulative effect of persistent inﬂation differentials
on intra-European cost competitiveness. The crisis shattered all remain-
ing enthusiasm for the EMS-based disinﬂation efforts of the 1980s (essen-
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5. See Saccomanni (1999).
6. The only blemish on TARGET’s record is the January 29 breakdown of its link with
the French RTGS system. Also, because of high transaction volume and a few minor tech-
nical problems, the ECB decided to extend the daily TARGET deadline by one hour from
January 11 through January 29. Normal working hours were then reestablished and have
been in effect ever since. 
7. On the EMS crisis see Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993);  Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti
(1998a, 1998b). 
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exchange rate targeting). As was said at the time, “fixed exchange rates
now seem much less effective as means to price stability than many of us
thought before. Therefore, monetary stability and credibility have to be
built at home with other means.”
8
For the countries that decided to stay out of the Exchange Rate Mech-
anism of the EMS, building stability and credibility at home meant, in
addition to fiscal rectitude, a reform of monetary policy signaling some
radical break with the past. The Bank of England and the Bank of Swe-
den adopted inflation targeting as a new comprehensive strategy to stabi-
lize prices. The other European countries were de facto freed from the
corset of a ﬁxed exchange rate in August 1993, once the bands around the
central exchange rate parities were widened up to 15 percent in either
direction. What constituted a departure from the past was a stronger
domestic political consensus to participate in EMU, and therefore to fulﬁll
all the formal prerequisites established in the Maastricht Treaty.
9 These
prerequisites included complying with the convergence criteria of the
treaty in terms of inflation, fiscal stance, and interest rates,
10 as well as
appropriate reforms to prepare central banks to be integrated into the new
European system. 
So, whereas for some countries the crisis led to largely new policy
strategies, other countries succeeded, over time, in conﬁrming their polit-
ical commitment to the Maastricht model of monetary integration through
macroeconomic convergence. As regards fiscal policies, most countries
adopted some cosmetic and temporary measures to pull their deficits
below the formal limit established at Maastricht (3 percent of GDP), but
even so, the European ﬁscal stance did show some fundamental improve-
ment in these years.
Since participation in EMU was conditional on having already achieved
low inflation, financial and exchange rate stability, and a small fiscal
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8. Svensson (1994, p. 467), emphasis added.
9. See Kenen (1995).
10. As the exchange rate convergence criterion was conceived as having ﬂuctuation mar-
gins around the central parities as large as 2.25 percent in each direction, its meaning
became less clear with the 1993 widening of the currency bands. In 1995 the European Mon-
etary Institute decided to include in its analysis of convergence an “ex post judgment” on the
degree of exchange rate stability inside the new bands. See European Monetary Institute
(1998, p. 37). 
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policy continuity at the birth of the euro. Whether by means of conver-
gence policies or not, macroeconomic stability was reached in Europe well
before the formal launch of the euro. National inﬂation rates were already
extremely low in 1997. Notably, the Asian and Russian crises of 1997–98
did not induce any significant wave of speculation in European financial
and currency markets. A common monetary policy de facto preceded the
birth of the common currency, as the ECB, established in June 1998, engi-
neered in December of that year a coordinated cut of interest rates by
nearly all the national central banks to the common level of 3 percent. (The
sole exception was Italy, which cut its rate to 3.5 percent.) 
According to several observers, the Eurosystem
11 was structured so as
to guarantee as much continuity as possible with the objectives and pol-
icy framework of those national central banks that had been most suc-
cessful in the past, notably the German Bundesbank. Continuity with the
Bundesbank was seen as key to endowing the newly created ECB with an
anti-inflationary reputation: at the birth of the euro, European countries
were, more than ever before, “borrowing credibility from the Bundes-
bank.” At the same time, continuity was seen as a way to reassure the
German public, who until the last were reluctant to give up the deutsche
mark. 
Not surprisingly, objections to the policy of continuity are at the heart
of the current debate over the ECB. Critics contend that European policy-
makers are missing an opportunity to build a monetary policy frame-
work suitable for Europe on its own merits, rather than on the merits of
the institutions (such as the Bundesbank or any other national central
bank) that have adopted the same strategy in the past. Given the political
dimension of European integration, most critics focus on the standards
of transparency and accountability of the ECB. Some urge the ECB to
change its strategy by moving toward explicit inflation targeting—a move
that would reduce the distance with the EU countries still outside of
EMU. Yet considerable uncertainty remains about the monetary archi-
tecture that will actually emerge in Europe as a result of the regime shift
associated with a switch to a common currency. The next two sections are
devoted to these issues.
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11. The Eurosystem comprises the ECB and the eleven national central banks of the euro
area. The ESCB comprises the ECB and the national central banks of all the EU countries.
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As a starting point for assessing criticisms of monetary strategies in
the euro area, we begin with a detailed overview of the ECB’s own expla-
nation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Maastricht Treaty stated that
“price stability” would be the primary objective of the ESCB. It also estab-
lished (in Article 2) that the ESCB is expected to support the general poli-
cies of the European Union as long as this can be done without prejudice
to the price stability objective (Article 105[1]). For a quantitative deﬁnition
of “price stability,” however, one had to wait until October 13, 1998, when
the Governing Council of the ECB ofﬁcially announced its monetary strat-
egy. The council defined price stability as a year-on-year increase in the
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP, essentially a consumer
price index without interest costs) for the euro area as a whole of less
than 2 percent, which is to be maintained over the medium run. The focus
on the euro area as a whole implies that sector- or region-specific shocks
will be considered only insofar as they provide information on the devel-
opment of the aggregate HICP. The word “increase” in the deﬁnition sug-
gests that the ECB is concerned about the “downward risk for price
stability” (that is, deflation). Thus any inflation rate in the range of 0 to 2
percent seems to be compatible with price stability, although a precise
lower bound has not been officially announced.
12 Incidentally, the choice
of 2 percent as the upper bound can be justified mainly on grounds of
continuity, as that is the value used in the past by the Bundesbank.
13
The reference to the medium run acknowledges that monetary authori-
ties might be unable to control short-run price variability. In particular, in
the presence of shocks threatening price stability, “a medium run orienta-
tion . . . is important in order to permit a gradualist and measured
response.”
14 Interpreting this remark in light of the experience of the Bun-
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12. Because of measurement bias, the rate of growth of the HICP may not coincide
with the true rate of inflation. As the HICP is a relatively new index, the sign and magni-
tude of its measurement bias are largely unknown. For this reason, the ECB is reluctant to
announce a lower bound for the definition of price stability before having learned more
about the properties of its price index.
13. See Angeloni, Gaspar, and Tristani (1999, p. 14). These authors also discuss “other
reasons [than continuity with the Bundesbank] to allow for small but non-zero inﬂation rate”
put forward in the literature, namely, nominal and real rigidities in prices and wages and
the lower bound at zero to nominal interest rates. 
14. European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, January 1999, p. 47.
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 301desbank seems to suggest that the ECB may show some flexibility in let-
ting inflation rise temporarily above 2 percent, say, when the economy is
hit by a supply shock. Perhaps to rule out expectations that any change in
prices outside the 0 to 2 percent range would automatically entail a pol-
icy response, the ECB has stressed that its quantitative definition of price
stability is not an inﬂation range target. Indeed, the deﬁnition of price sta-
bility by the ECB differs in two ways from that of an inflation target as
usually understood: ﬁrst, it is time- and state-invariant; and second, its time
horizon, the medium run, is not precisely quantiﬁed. Yet the announcement
of “an objective benchmark” for the rate of inﬂation in the medium run is
presented as “the most important step [taken by the ECB] to achieve
accountability.”
15
In addition to the quantitative definition of price stability, the mone-
tary strategy of the ECB rests on two “pillars”: a reference value for the
annual growth rate of M3 (a broad monetary aggregate), and a broad
assessment of the outlook for future price developments and the risks to
price stability. The M3 reference value, according to the ECB, is not to be
considered a target but rather a “realistic alternative to a monetary tar-
get.”
16 That is to say, “deviations of monetary growth from the reference
value will signal risks to price stability” and would prompt further analy-
sis to identify and interpret the economic disturbances that caused the
deviation. However, no automatic policy reaction should be expected when
the actual monetary aggregate deviates from its reference value. 
The ECB has chosen to announce a single reference value (4.5 per-
cent) for annual M3 growth, rather than a range as in the tradition of the
Bundesbank. The calculation of the M3 reference value, however, fol-
lows the German tradition: as Frederic Mishkin has noted, it is a very
public exercise.
17 Upon its announcement, the 4.5 percent reference value
was explained using a quantity-equation framework,
18 together with esti-
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15. See Angeloni, Gaspar, and Tristani (1999, p. 15).
16. Wim Duisenberg, “The ESCB’s Stability-Oriented Monetary Policy Strategy,”
speech to the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, November 10, 1998.
17. See Mishkin (1999).
18. The basic formula for the derivation of the Bundesbank’s monetary targets was as
follows: the growth of (real) production potential plus the medium-term price assumption
plus any addition or deduction for the longer-term change in the velocity of circulation of
money equals the growth of the money stock that is consistent with the production potential.
See Deutsche Bundesbank (1995, p. 81).
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of –0.5 to –1 percent) and trend output growth (in the range of 2 to 2.5 per-
cent). Under these assumptions, the annual increase in the HICP associ-
ated with a 4.5 percent growth rate of M3 is in the range of 1 to 2 percent.
Like the Bundesbank, the ECB uses trend GDP growth, rather than GDP
growth forecasts, in order to distance its policy from short-run considera-
tions of employment and cyclical conditions. This practice allows for sta-
bilization: other things being equal, calculating the reference value in this
way allows for the provision of more liquidity during recessions and less
during periods of overheating.
19
Judging from the ﬁrst few issues of the ECB’s monthly bulletin, the sec-
ond pillar amounts to an analysis of a rather long and diverse list of indi-
cators.
20 The vagueness in the definition of the second pillar raises the
critical question as to which analytical framework—which economic and
econometric model—the ECB will use to filter the relevant information
from such a diverse set of variables. What the ECB itself claims in this
respect is that the Eurosystem “will evaluate the full range of inflation
forecasts produced by international organisations, other authorities, mar-
ket participants, etc., and will also produce its own assessment of the
future inﬂation outlook.”
21 But at least so far, the ECB has not been willing
to publish its forecasts, and it has virtually declined to discuss how it reads
third-party forecasts in formulating its strategy.
22
This attitude toward inflation forecasts exhibits a striking resemblance
to that of the Bundesbank, whose monthly and annual reports neither pub-
lish the organization’s own forecasts of economic variables nor discuss pri-
vate sector forecasts.
23 The ECB explains its decision not to publish its
inflation forecasts by arguing that giving prominence to a single official
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19. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, January 1998.
20. See European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, April 1999, pp. 27–40. Angeloni,
Gaspar, and Tristani (1999) group these indicators into five classes: gap measures (for
instance, the output gap, the capacity utilization rate, unemployment); labor cost measures
(wage dynamics, unit labor costs); international prices and exchange rates; asset prices
(the yield curve, interest rates); and measures of expectations (business and consumer con-
ﬁdence surveys).
21. European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, January 1999, p. 50.
22. The June bulletin includes a short section on inﬂation forecasts by the International
Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See
Centre for Economic Policy Research (1999b) for a discussion of this point.
23. See, for instance, Mishkin and Posen (1997).
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the Governing Council, and would ultimately confuse and mislead the
public.
24 It is also plausible that, especially in the initial phase of EMU, the
ECB does not want to be evaluated as a forecaster and held responsible for
forecast errors, given the considerable uncertainty about the time-series
properties of the relevant real and financial variables, or to be tied to any
particular econometric model. If this interpretation is correct, it may be
that, in the future, the ECB will consider some form of public discussion
of inﬂation forecasts, without necessarily implying a formal change in its
strategy.
25
We conclude by noting that, shortly before EMU, German central
bankers suggested that the ECB should combine elements of both mone-
tary and inflation targeting: “this would place the ECB under a double
obligation to justify its action. It would have to explain its policy to the
public in terms of both its monetary target and its price expectations. Com-
prehensive transparency of this kind might assist in rapidly establishing
the credibility that is needed for a successful monetary policy.”
26Although
the two pillars in the new monetary framework suggest acceptance of the
idea of combining elements of both monetary and inﬂation targeting, it is
worth emphasizing that in its strategy the ECB eschews the notion of tar-
gets per se. 
As part of the ECB’s effort to ensure transparency and accountability,
the president of the ECB holds a press conference immediately after the
first meeting of the Governing Council every month,
27 and provides an
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24. See Wim Duisenberg, “The ESCB’s Stability-Oriented Monetary Policy Strategy,”
speech to the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, November 10, 1998.
25. According to Angeloni, Gaspar, and Tristani (1999), the ECB is determined to pub-
lish its internal econometric models (although not the forecasts) as soon as they have been
sufﬁciently tested. Currently, the ECB relies on a quarterly macroeconometric model for the
euro area and, in conjunction with the national central banks, a quarterly multicountry
model.
26. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, January 1998. See also the brief but effec-
tive discussion by Dornbusch (1997) of the intellectual debate between Bundesbank President
Hans Tietmeyer and ECB Executive Board member Otmar Issing before EMU took place. 
27. The decisionmaking body of the ECB, the Governing Council, comprises the gov-
ernors of all eleven national central banks in the Eurosystem plus the ECB’s Executive
Board (the president, vice-president, and four other members). Decisionmaking in the euro
zone is thus currently in the hands of seventeen persons (and will involve twenty-one when
all the EU countries have joined EMU). For comparison, the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee and the Bank of Japan’s Policy Board have nine members each.
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sis and data in the ECB’s monthly bulletin, as well as speeches by mem-
bers of the ECB Executive Board, are meant to supplement the president’s
statement. The ECB, however, does not publish the minutes of the meet-
ings, claiming that the president’s press conference provides all relevant
information—a claim contested by some ECB watchers.
28 By the same
token, the voting records are kept secret. This feature largely conforms to
the model of “collective responsibility”—the formal exclusion of any
account of internal disagreement—that characterizes the history of the
Bundesbank. 
An annual and four quarterly reports on the activities of the Eurosystem
are submitted to the EU Council of Ministers, to the Commission of the
European Communities, and to the European Parliament (EP), which then
holds a general debate on the ﬁndings. Members of the Executive Board of
the ECB testify before the committees of the EP, either on their own ini-
tiative or on the initiative of the EP. An open issue is to what extent the
EP will be willing to exercise its powers, for instance by putting pressure
on the ECB to provide more information about its decisionmaking
process.
29
Issues in Implementing the Eurosystem Strategy 
Over the short history of EMU, the correspondence—or lack thereof—
between actual monetary policy and the announced monetary framework
has been the object of extensive scrutiny and debate. Here we analyze the
main points of this debate by organizing our discussion around three key
questions. First, does the Eurosystem focus strictly on price stability to the
exclusion of other concerns? Second, is its strategy systematically biased
in favor of the cyclically weaker countries in EMU? And third, what role
does the strategy assign to broad monetary aggregates?  
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28. See, for example, Buiter (1999b).
29. Tabellini (1998) proposes that the EP take the initiative on ECB transparency and
accountability, for instance by demanding that the ECB publish its internal inflation fore-
casts in the form of an inﬂation report. 
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On announcing its monetary strategy in October 1998, the ECB
expressed its intention to adhere to a strict interpretation of its mandate to
guarantee price stability. Moreover, the ECB has frequently asserted that
“central bank[s] should, above all, avoid being, in themselves, an additional
source of uncertainty” for the market, and make sure that their actions are
“understood and therefore predictable.”
30 Many market participants inter-
preted this as a move away from the style of the Bundesbank, which often
took pride in having surprised the market by its actions.
31
Nevertheless, the ECB’s interest rate cut of 50 basis points on April 8,
1999, came at a time of strong disagreement among market participants
about the direction of the ECB’s next move, and its size surprised almost
everyone. One of the main arguments in favor of the cut was fresh evi-
dence of a deteriorating economic outlook for Germany and Italy, which
together account for more than half of euro area GDP. Thus the move
clearly responded to cyclical conditions. Yet the need for further mone-
tary easing at that time was controversial. For instance, during 1998 many
countries’interest rates had already declined toward the German level, and
as already noted, the ECB had engineered a coordinated rate cut in Decem-
ber of that year. If one takes into account the “long and variable lags”
with which monetary policy affects the economy, the generalized fall in
interest rates in the preceding quarters meant that a significant monetary
stimulus was already under way. Some indicators were indeed providing
signals in this direction: M3 growth was 50 basis points above the refer-
ence value, credit to the private sector was growing at a high and sus-
tained rate, and a weakening euro (along with recovery in Asia) was
improving export demand. 
Some observers and market participants have criticized the ECB for
paying too much attention to short-term trends in economic activity and
for allowing too much latitude for discretion in its monetary strategy,
relative to what—in their view—the ECB’s own statements initially sug-
gested. According to these critics, in April 1999 the ECB disappointed
the markets in two respects. First, it showed that its commitment to price
stability really coexists with other concerns. Second, it did not opt for a
306 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
30. The quotations are from Issing (1999a, pp. 12 and 29). The same concept is
expressed in many other documents of the ECB.
31. See, for instance, Goldman Sachs, European Weekly Analyst 99/24, June 25, 1999. 
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 306conservative stance (no rate cut) or more predictable conduct (a smaller
rate cut) in a situation of widespread disagreement about its likely next
move. 
Such criticism, however, is hard to justify in light of the monetary con-
stitution of Europe as established by Article 105(1) of the Maastricht
Treaty. Provided that it does not see its actions as putting price stability at
risk in the medium run—and at the time of this writing (September 1999)
annual inﬂation has been around 1 percent, at the very center of the refer-
ence range—the Eurosystem is expected to support countercyclical poli-
cies. Also, a strict focus on price stability need not imply that the output
gap and unemployment must be ignored in policy decisions, but rather that
they are treated exclusively as indicators of future inflation or deflation.
Recent econometric evidence suggests that these indicators were indeed
used in this way by the Bundesbank.
32
The ECB cannot afford to overlook the risk that, in a scenario of gen-
eralized growth slowdown, national policymakers will decide to postpone
important structural reforms. This consideration may help explain the
ECB’s April decision, especially as regards the size of the interest rate
cut. A large cut was expected to create the appropriate macroeconomic
conditions for national authorities to carry out reforms of the budget and
the labor market. The former is seen as an essential element for stability
in the euro area, and the latter as the key policy to reduce the region’s
high rates of unemployment.
33 This motivation is clear in the ECB presi-
dent’s statement accompanying the April 8 cut:
The decision taken today . . . contributes to creating an economic environment
in which the considerable growth potential of the euro area could be exploited.
Those responsible for other policy areas are urged now even more to take the
necessary steps to improve longer-term growth prospects for the euro area
through strictly and decisively adhering to the aims of the Stability and Growth
Pact and through convincing structural reforms in the economy.34
The view that policy coordination should be conducive to structural
reforms is reflected in many initiatives at the EU level, such as the adop-
tion of the European Employment Pact at the summit meeting in Cologne
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32. See, for instance, Favero and Rovelli (1999).
33. For a discussion of this thesis, see the paper by Laurence Ball in this issue of Brook-
ings Papers.
34. Wim Duisenberg, speech prepared for press conference, Frankfurt,April 8, 1999.
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 307in June 1999. Notably, the pact promotes a macroeconomic “dialogue” in
Europe among national governments, the European Commission, the
ECB, and social partners (that is, the unions). Although the content and
goals of this dialogue are only vaguely deﬁned, this European forum could
play an important role in addressing basic political and distributional
issues stemming from what will surely be an extensive adjustment process
in European labor markets. Yet policy coordination remains to a large
extent an open issue in post-EMU Europe.
Is Eurosystem Policy Biased in Favor of the Weaker Countries? 
Economists of the “Monitoring the ECB”group at the Centre for Economic
Policy Research in London have interpreted the April rate cut as a sign that
the ECB is pursuing its mandate in a balanced way, avoiding both exces-
sively narrow and excessively restrictive interpretations. The same group,
however, also writes, “although the ECB has vowed not to look at national
situations, the interest rate cut was easier to understand in light of the
economic situation in the weaker member countries rather than in light of
the aggregate data in Euroland.”
35While the cyclical condition of Germany
and Italy was deteriorating at the time of the rate cut, GDP in other EMU
countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, was growing at sustained
rates. There was a consensus that France, too, was growing at a rate
exceeding 2 percent. Some observers are inclined to read the April deci-
sion to expand the money supply as an indication that the Eurosystem is
somewhat biased in favor of the cyclically laggard countries.
36
It has been suggested that the root of this presumed bias toward weaker
countries in the euro area could be the constraints on ﬁscal policy implied
by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), as analyzed later in this paper. In
the presence of asymmetric cyclical conditions, the argument goes, a sin-
gle monetary policy cannot ﬁt the needs of all countries, but national gov-
ernments can still use fiscal policy toward their output and employment
goals. If the monetary stance reﬂects the average cyclical conditions of the
area as a whole, stronger countries will have to contract, and weaker coun-
tries expand, their fiscal stance to achieve the desired level of aggregate
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35. Centre for Economic Policy Research (1999b, p. 1). 
36. Similar views were expressed in the aftermath of the December 1998 coordinated
rate cut. See, for instance, Martin Feldstein and Kathleen Feldstein, “Currency’s Effects on
Booming Economy Worry Some: Ireland’s Euro Struggle,” Boston Globe, January 5, 1999,
p. C4. 
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weaker countries can let their budget deficits increase. As their budgets
automatically deteriorate in a downturn, these countries may not have
enough room to implement the desired fiscal expansions. The problem
clearly diminishes if monetary policy is tailored to the need of the cycli-
cally laggard countries, since the SGP does not constrain the size of ﬁscal
restrictions. Note that such a strategy would also favor a long-run reduc-
tion of national debts and deficits, as the policy mix would be biased
toward an easy money–tight budget conﬁguration. 
Can this argument play a substantial role in Eurosystem strategy? In our
view there are two main problems. First, suppose that the laggard countries
were those experiencing major structural problems, such as high levels of
public debt or highly regulated labor markets. The ECB’s policy stance
could be misinterpreted as subverting the fiscal discipline that EMU
should impose on its members. Second, the argument presupposes that all
the countries in relatively good cyclical shape are willing and able to adopt
timely budget cuts of the appropriate size, to keep the overall policy mix
from becoming too expansionary. Thus the absence of risks for price sta-
bility depends on some form of monetary and ﬁscal coordination that may
not exist. 
A different argument is that the ECB would tend to focus on large coun-
tries, whether cyclically strong or cyclically weak, simply because of
their weight in the euro area. This argument is not persuasive on techni-
cal grounds. There could be theoretical and practical reasons for weigh-
ing regional developments differently than suggested by their relevance for
euro area GDP. For instance, the presence of structural links across regions
could determine speciﬁc patterns of international transmission of the busi-
ness cycle: responding to cyclical development in one region could be an
effective way to implement a preemptive policy action for the euro area
as a whole. In any case, given the short history of EMU, limited under-
standing of the international transmission of the business cycle within the
euro area suggests caution in adopting such an interpretation. 
It is worth stressing that the ECB has not provided any information on
the role of regional asymmetries in its decision process. So far, the
monthly bulletins include almost no reference to local conditions and indi-
cators in the discussion of monetary developments in the euro area. The
rare allusions to country-specific situations do not specify which country
they refer to. Such a striking omission may reﬂect a pedagogical objective,
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whole. But it could also be attributed to the ECB’s desire for caution in
dealing with regional considerations, in view of their potential political
impact. 
Does the Eurosystem Assign a Prominent Role 
to Monetary Aggregates?
As already noted, in the few months in the life of EMU to date, the
annual rate of growth of M3 in the euro area has exceeded the reference
value of 4.5 percent. From a three-month average of 5.2 percent between
January and March, it gradually increased to 5.9 percent between July
and September. Despite this overshooting of the reference value for the
first pillar, as late as August 1999 M3 developments were not seen “as
signaling inflationary pressures.”
37 Demand for liquidity has been buoy-
ant throughout the period: growth of overnight deposits in particular has
been higher during 1999 than before EMU, and uncertainty about the year-
2000 (Y2K) computer problem could cause investors to accumulate more
liquid assets over the last quarter of 1999. Although not formally a com-
ponent of the first pillar, the rate of growth of credit to the private sector
has also remained strong during 1999 and accelerated at the beginning of
the summer.
38
Ultimately, how the ECB will use the first pillar in practice remains
unclear. The often-mentioned experience of the Bundesbank shows that,
between 1975 and 1995, the German annual money target was achieved
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37. European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, August 1999, p. 5. The text continues:
“. . . careful monitoring will be necessary in the coming months, particularly in view of the
fact that the dynamic growth of the most liquid components of M3 and of credit to the pri-
vate sector implies that euro area residents are not facing liquidity constraints at present.”
38. Assessing the potential inﬂationary implications of the high rate of growth of credit
to households and corporations that continued from 1998 throughout the first months of
1999 is one key to the ECB’s analysis of prospective inﬂationary risk. Credit to the private
sector is increasing at a rate exceeding 10 percent a year. As presented in various issues of
the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, potential explanations include low interest rates (which stim-
ulate bank lending), asymmetric local conditions (high growth rates and booming real estate
markets in some countries), and the ﬁnancing of mergers and acquisitions, as well as rising
inventories, changes in tax regulation at the end of the year, and above all, the ﬁnancing of
investment abroad by euro area residents. Stressing this last item, the ECB points out that
the growth of private credit does not necessarily translate into higher domestic spending.
The relative importance of each of these explanations is, however, unclear.
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 310only about 50 percent of the time,39 and that most of the misses were inten-
tional.40 In other words, the reliability of the M3 growth rate as a leading
indicator of inflation was dubious, even in the country with the strongest
proclaimed reliance on monetary targeting. “Continuity” with the Bun-
desbank would then suggest that the ECB, too, will frequently let M3
growth drift away from its reference value without acting to correct such
behavior. 
What is the rationale for bringing monetary indicators center stage in
the ofﬁcial Eurosystem strategy? At least three answers can be suggested.
The ﬁrst argument, made by the ECB itself, is that monetary aggregates
may provide a more dependable guide for monetary policy in the euro area
as a whole than they have in single member states. Econometric studies
show, in fact, that money demand appears to be more stable in a larger
European context than in any national environment, both in the short and
in the medium run.41 A key problem with these studies, however, is that,
to obtain sufficiently long series for European money, prices, output, and
interest rates, they must necessarily rely on pre-EMU country-specific
information. This procedure is an easy target for the Lucas critique, since
there is no presumption that the time-series properties of the variables con-
sidered are invariant to the EMU regime shift. For instance, Ivo Arnold
points out that the relatively good performance of average European mon-
etary aggregates as leading indicators of inﬂation in the past could be dri-
ven by the low correlation of country-specific shocks, which cancel each
other out in the process of aggregation.42To the extent that country-speciﬁc
shocks become positively correlated in EMU, the demand-for-money
function becomes correspondingly less stable. The ECB acknowledges
this point but, on the basis of findings from simulation studies,43 consid-
ers its quantitative importance rather limited.44
A second interpretation sees the choice of mixing (weak) elements from
both inflation and monetary targeting in the Eurosystem framework as an
implicit declaration that the ECB is unwilling, in the present circum-
stances, to commit to a specific strategy, model, or vision of monetary
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39. See Deutsche Bundesbank (1995, p. 79) and Von Hagen (1998).
40. See Issing (1997, p. 71).
41. See Angeloni, Cottarelli, and Levy (1994); Monticelli and Papi (1996).
42. Arnold (1994).
43. See, for instance, Fagan and Henry (1998).
44. See Issing (1999a, p. 18).
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time to develop some understanding of the new economic environment and
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Europe. Even the avail-
ability and quality of data, although rapidly improving, are still far from
adequate.
45 A monetary policy strategy based on direct inflation targeting
is deemed, for better or worse, infeasible because of the difficulties of
forecasting price developments in current circumstances.
46 At the same
time, the major economic changes sweeping the euro area are likely to
exacerbate all kinds of short- and medium-term problems with monetary
aggregates as leading indicators of inﬂation. In view of these unique con-
ditions and the circumstances of particular uncertainty associated with
the start of EMU, the Eurosystem attributes high value to flexibility in
choosing among alternative policy strategies. 
A third argument, already mentioned, is that the first pillar provides a
public sign of adherence to the tradition of the Bundesbank, under the
presumption that continuity in itself will enhance the ECB’s credibility.
Alan Blinder puts the credibility problem faced by central banks in the fol-
lowing terms: “central bankers may want the latitude to change short-run
tactics (e.g., abandon a money growth target) without being thought to
have changed their long-run strategy (e.g., fighting inflation). To pull off
such a feat without spooking the markets, it helps to have a reputation for
keeping your word.”
47 Now, at the launch of EMU—precisely when the
need for flexibility and discretion is greatest—the Eurosystem starts off
without a track record on which to base its credibility. At the same time,
however, EMU does not start off in a historical vacuum: one of the national
central banks absorbed by the new system is the unchallenged repository
of anti-inﬂationary reputation in Europe. The better the Eurosystem is able
to signal continuity of strategy and behavior between its experience and
the Bundesbank’s, the richer the perceived bequest of credibility accruing
312 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
45. See the discussion in Issing (1999a). The introduction of the new European System of
Accounts 1995 provides a good example of the discontinuity in statistical information faced
by the ECB. The new system adopts many conceptual changes from past accounting
schemes, affecting both the level and the rate of growth of GDP. Estimates of growth and
external trade in the first quarter of 1999 have been revised substantially upward under the
new methodology (European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, August 1999, pp. 18–20).
46. See Otmar Issing, “Monetary Policy in EMU,” speech given in Washington, Octo-
ber 6, 1998.
47. Blinder (1998, pp. 65–66). 
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value [for money growth] ensures as far as possible continuity with suc-
cessful monetary strategies in the euro area in the past.”
48
A problem with this argument is that, as discussed above, the Bundes-
bank’s adherence to monetary targeting was more formal than effective,
and the anti-inflationary reputation of the German central bank was not
really based on such adherence. (It has even been argued that the Bundes-
bank’s reputation was achieved despite the monetary targets.) From this
vantage point, it is not obvious that continuity with the Bundesbank is the
best possible course of action for the ECB. Critics stress that credibility
will actually be hampered by the adoption of the first pillar. Decisions
made while paying limited attention to the growth rate of M3 will have to
be explained to the public while pretending that monetary developments
are nonetheless essential leading indicators of inﬂation. A cosmetic token
of continuity with the Bundesbank could be harmless, provided that in its
communications strategy the ECB is able to provide a convincing account
of its true decision process. But the risk emphasized by ECB critics is
that the ﬁrst pillar may become a smokescreen, hiding the true motivations
of monetary decisions. In that case, it is argued, lack of openness and
transparency cannot but induce the impression of a very high degree of dis-
cretion, eroding rather than increasing any initial capital of credibility
that the ECB has managed to inherit from the past.
49
These objections to the first pillar are part of a general concern with
the choice of the Bundesbank as a model for the ECB. Critics such as
Willem Buiter argue that key elements in the Bundesbank strategy, such as
secrecy and collective responsibility, are inappropriate in the euro area
context.
50 Secrecy and collective responsibility undermine the ability of
external observers to judge the behavior and relative competence of the
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48. Wim Duisenberg, “The ESCB’s Stability-Oriented Monetary Policy Strategy,” cited
in note 24.
49. In this respect, Lars Svensson writes (1999, p. 1), “the choice between inﬂation tar-
geting and Bundesbank-style ‘pragmatic’monetary targeting is, in effect, a choice between
high and low transparency. Inﬂation targeting and pragmatic monetary targeting, in practice,
imply similar policy decisions, but pragmatic monetary targeting implies that policy deci-
sions are explained in terms of money-growth developments that are not essential for policy.
. . . [T]he Eurosystem . . . proposes a prominent role for an essentially irrelevant money-
growth indicator in analysis and communication, but will keep secret the inflation forecast
that will, in practice, be the decisive input in policy decisions.”
50. Buiter (1999b).
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probability of reappointment of less competent members, the efficiency
of the ECB is reduced. Also, as individual members of the council have a
weaker incentive to express their disagreement with a dissenting vote, they
provide a fertile ground for compromises reflecting special interests—
and denying the statutory mandate of the ECB. 
A widely discussed issue is whether lack of public accountability gives
Governing Council members more discretion in defending national and
partisan views in the process of policymaking. Realistically, national pol-
icymakers will have a great deal of information about the positions of indi-
vidual council members. As the latter do not have to explain their behavior
to the public of the euro area, pressures from national institutions and
lobbies may become more effective, implying an excessive influence of
regional considerations. However, given the complex dynamics of a deci-
sion process in a body with seventeen members, secrecy could also favor
the (perhaps excessive) centralization of power in the hands of the presi-
dent of the ECB. At this early stage in the history of EMU, it is hard to
determine which of these considerations will be more important. The
French protest over the appointment of the first president of the ECB in
June 1998, which reportedly led to the awkward agreement to split the ﬁrst
term between the current president and the French candidate, suggests that
this initial period in the ECB’s life will be dominated by the search for a
political equilibrium within which diverse national interests can coexist.
Instruments of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area
The new operational framework of the Eurosystem hinges upon three
monetary policy instruments: open market operations, standing facilities,
and reserve requirements.
51 These instruments affect all credit institutions
established in the euro area, both domestic institutions and branches of
overseas banks. It should be stressed that, although decisions regarding the
use of these instruments are made by the ECB, operations are then tech-
nically implemented by the national central banks.
314 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
51. The official reference on the monetary policy instruments and procedures of the
Eurosystem is European Central Bank (1998). 
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 314Open market operations typically take the form of repurchase agree-
ments (repos) implemented by the national central banks through auctions:
banks bid for liquidity by offering collateral.
52 The main reﬁnancing oper-
ations, short-term interventions having a maturity of two weeks that are
undertaken by the ECB every Tuesday, play the key role in steering inter-
est rates and managing market liquidity. Longer-term refinancing opera-
tions, carried out every month, with a maturity of three months, are not
generally meant to provide speciﬁc signals of the monetary policy stance.
In 1999 the main refinancing operations have occurred at a fixed rate
(the so-called reﬁ rate). As shown in ﬁgure 1, this rate was 3 percent until
April 8, when the ECB announced a cut of 50 basis points, to take effect
with the next operation. In a fixed-rate repo, the ECB controls both the
price and the quantity of money. A representative short-term operation
takes the following form. The ECB announces the tender by 3:30 p.m. on
Monday. The counterparties have until 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday to submit
their bids. At 11:15 a.m. the ECB announces the total amount of liquidity
to be allotted. The submitted bids are then satisfied pro rata, according to
the ratio of the allotment to the sum of the bids, and settlement takes place
on Wednesday.
53 Settlement takes place one day after the trading day to
prevent the auction from being affected by a scarcity of liquidity due to the
settlement of earlier operations. 
Technical aspects of the auction, such as the publication of the auction
calendar well in advance of the tenders and the one-day delay between
auction and settlement, represent elements of continuity with the proce-
dures of the Bundesbank and other, but not all, European central banks.
Before the euro, for instance, the Bank of Italy did not consider a prede-
termined auction calendar well suited to managing the sharp fluctuations
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52. The Eurosystem may also use outright transactions, the issuance of debt certifi-
cates, foreign exchange swaps, and the collection of ﬁxed-term deposits.
53. The longer-term operations are implemented instead through variable-rate tenders:
the counterparties bid the amounts of money and the interest rates at which they want to
enter into transactions with the national central banks. In the case of liquidity-providing ten-
ders, the ECB lists the bids in diminishing order of offered rates: the bids with the higher
interest rates have priority and are accepted until the total liquidity to be allotted is
exhausted. In the early stage of EMU the allotment method was by Dutch auction, in which
all tenders are satisfied at the lowest or “marginal” interest rate. This was done to prevent
smaller institutions with less information about market conditions from being penalized
compared with larger institutions. From March 24 onward the method is by American auc-
tion, in which successful bidders pay the rate they bid.
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 315induced by the Italian Treasury’s activities.
54Already, the liquidity impact
of activities by the treasuries of France, Italy, and Spain has posed a chal-
lenge to the forecasting ability of the ECB.
The preference for fixed-rate auctions as the mechanism for the main
reﬁnancing operations is also controversial. A typical feature of ﬁxed-rate
short-term operations in 1999 has in fact been substantial overbidding. The
ratio between the amount allotted by the ECB and the total amount of
bids was often below 10 percent during the ﬁrst seven months of 1999; in
July it ranged between 4.2 and 7.4 percent. Since the ECB does not indi-
cate the amount of funds it intends to allot at the tender, and since coun-
terparties need only have sufficient collateral to cover the successful
portion of their bid, institutions tend to present larger bids than necessary.
This is particularly the case in situations where banks are concerned with
316 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
Figure 1. Interest Rates in the Euro Area, 1999
Percent per year












Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
a. Euro overnight index average.
54. See Bianchi and others (1999, p. 77).
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 316liquidity redistribution in the interbank market and prefer direct access to
Eurosystem funds.
55 This procedure injects uncertainty into the environ-
ment for European banks.
Recently, the Eurosystem has been considering a switch from ﬁxed-rate
to variable-rate tenders. Implementing short-term variable-rate auctions
would attain two goals: they would provide a better picture of conditions
in the money market, and they would eliminate the overbidding problem.
However, in a context of incipient inflationary pressures already priced
into forward rates, markets may interpret such a switch as a signal of pol-
icymakers’ desire for higher rates. This consideration may have played a
role in the ECB’s choice to maintain fixed-rate tenders over time, despite
the problems just described. The ECB’s initial preference for fixed-rate
tenders probably stems from the fact that the Bundesbank adopted the
same mechanism during the last stage of the transition to EMU. For the
record, expectations of a switch to ﬂexible-rate tenders arose in Germany
in the second half of 1997, once again in an environment of incipient over-
heating and a depreciating currency. However, in that situation the Bun-
desbank opted for an increase in the refi rate (in mid-October 1997, from
3 percent to 3.3 percent) while maintaining ﬁxed-rate tenders.
56
Assets accepted as collateral for the Eurosystem’s open market opera-
tions are classiﬁed according to a two-tier system. Tier I collateral satisﬁes
euro area–wide standards, whereas tier II collateral is certified by indi-
vidual national central banks and includes marketable and nonmarketable
debt instruments as well as equities. To reduce the moral hazard problem
of national central banks certifying risky national assets as collaterizable,
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55. In the early stages of EMU some confusion regarding the allocation mechanism
described above resulted in a somewhat asymmetric allocation of liquidity across coun-
tries. In fact, institutions in countries such as Spain or Italy, where the mechanism was less
familiar, had a tendency to be overcautious in their bids, reportedly acting under the pre-
sumption that sufficient collateral was required to cover the full extent of the bids. The
asymmetry disappeared after the ECB clariﬁed in a press release (on February 2) that avail-
ability of collateral was required only on the date of settlement of the tender, not at the
time of the bids. See Bianchi and others (1999, p. 78) and International Monetary Fund
(1999, annex 1).
56. In previous years, the German central bank had moved back and forth between ﬁxed-
and variable-rate fourteen-day tenders. Before October 1992, the adoption of a combina-
tion of fixed- and variable-rate operations (such as the “mixed double-decker” since Sep-
tember 1988, involving one-month fixed-rate tenders combined with a two-month
variable-rate tender) was meant to let markets inﬂuence interest rates while providing a clear
signal as to where the central bank wanted interest rates to move.
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Eurosystem bears the default risk for tier I assets.
57 The two-tier system
seeks to ensure equal treatment of ﬁnancial institutions residing in differ-
ent countries, while at the same time minimizing the risk of losses in the
monetary operations of the Eurosystem. It is motivated by the numerous
idiosyncrasies in national financial systems and by the political demand
that EMU respect diversity in national financial cultures and traditions.
Although such diversity may disappear in the long run, by recognizing
the permanent need for a two-tier system the Eurosystem acknowledges
that a common currency alone will not eliminate crucial asymmetries in
national ﬁnancial markets.
58
In contrast to open market operations, which provide or absorb short-
term liquidity at the initiative of the Eurosystem, two constantly available
(“standing”) facilities provide or absorb overnight liquidity at the initiative
of individual counterparties. Upon presentation of collateral, institutions
can borrow from the Eurosystem unlimited overnight funds through the
marginal lending facility, and can deposit overnight funds with the Euro-
system through the deposit facility. The Eurosystem determines the ofﬁcial
borrowing and lending rates, effectively setting upper and lower bounds for
the overnight market rates at which institutions borrow from and lend to
each other. The history of this interest rate “corridor” in the first part of
1999 is plotted in figure 1. After a brief introductory period in which the
range of fluctuation was quite narrow (plus or minus 0.25 percent around
the 3 percent reﬁ rate), the marginal lending rate was set at 4.5 percent and
the deposit facility rate at 2 percent. Note that the corridor at that point
became asymmetric around the refi rate: the relatively high rate on
overnight ofﬁcial loans provided banks an incentive to manage liquidity in
318 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
57. According to the “correspondent central banking model,” both tier I and tier II assets
eligible for Eurosystem operations may be used in a cross-border context, implying that an
institution can receive funds from the central bank of the country in which the institution is
established by making use of assets located in another member state.
58. At the end of March 1999, tier I and tier II assets available for open market operations
and payments system purposes summed to approximately €5.2 trillion. Over 97 percent con-
sisted of tier I collateral. Government paper accounted for 76 percent of marketable collat-
eral, and securities issued by credit institutions for 18 percent. Bonds and medium-term
notes accounted for 91 percent of the instruments, short-term notes for 8 percent, and equi-
ties and other types of assets for the remaining 1 percent. See European Central Bank,
Monthly Bulletin, May 1999, p. 33.
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 318an efﬁcient way. The asymmetry disappeared, however, after April 8, when
the two rates were lowered to 3.5 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively.
Use of the two standing facilities was particularly high during the first
weeks of EMU, more as a result of the high volatility of money market
rates within the narrow interest rate corridor than because of problems
with the TARGET system. In January, because of the high volatility of
overnight rates and some dispersion among rates quoted in different coun-
tries (although spreads did not exceed 10 basis points), both standing facil-
ities were often simultaneously in use. This anomaly has occasionally
recurred, for instance on July 14, 1999. 
Credit institutions in the euro area are subject to a minimum reserve
requirement of 2 percent of all deposits and debt with a maturity of less
than two years (repos and interbank liabilities are excluded). There is no
penalty for holding required reserves: these are in fact remunerated at the
average refi rate over the maintenance period, which runs from the 24th
of one calendar month to the 23rd of the next. The amount of required
reserves for the current period is estimated using balance-sheet data for the
end of the previous period (this is done on a quarterly basis for smaller
institutions). Over the maintenance period the reserve requirement must be
met on an average rather than a day-to-day basis.
59 In the monetary pol-
icy framework of the Eurosystem, required reserves are meant not to be
an instrument for short-term control of the money stock, but rather to
improve the ability of the ECB to operate efficiently as a provider of liq-
uidity, by creating or increasing a structural liquidity shortage.
Liquidity Management and the Money Market
The monetary policy framework just described provides the institu-
tional context within which to analyze the euro area money market. Two
points are worth emphasizing. On the one hand, the new pan-European
payments and settlement system has performed well, as the introduction of
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59. At the end of each day, however, the reserve accounts with the national central
banks are required to be nonnegative. At the end of the maintenance period, reserve holdings
in excess of requirements are not remunerated (and if they are transferred to the Eurosystem
through the deposit facility, they are remunerated at the lowest overnight rate). Failure to
meet the reserve requirements is subject to penalties. 
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 319the euro has brought about an almost immediate convergence of national
money market interest rates. On the other hand, difﬁculties have emerged
in the process of liquidity management, and elements of market segmen-
tation have been observed.
Since the launch of EMU and the redenomination of deposits in euros,
the new TARGET payments system has been the essential catalyst for
monetary integration in Europe. TARGET is composed of the real-time
gross settlement systems of the EMU members and the ECB, connected by
a set of common infrastructures and procedures. The key advantage of
TARGET is its operational speed: settlements are immediate and ﬁnal pro-
vided the sending institution has sufﬁcient funds or overdraft facilities with
a national central bank. However, TARGET is relatively expensive, in
terms of both its pricing policy and its collateral requirements.
60 More than
€1 trillion in daily payments were processed on an average day in Janu-
ary. Payments volume has since decreased (in May and June the daily aver-
ages were €869 billion and €923 billion, respectively), but the order of
magnitude remains similar to that of the US Fedwire system.
61
Since TARGET’s inception, liquidity in the money market has
improved across all maturities. The high volume of transactions is partic-
ularly evident in the overnight market, where the volume of trade exceeds
€55 billion daily. The average ticket size has also increased relative to the
sum of transactions in national currencies before conversion. Reportedly,
trades in excess of €150 million are common, and trades of up to €5 billion
have been recorded.
62
Among sources of price information, the euro area–measured EONIA,
or euro overnight index average,
63 has emerged as the benchmark
overnight interest rate, dominating its competitor EURONIA, an equiva-
lent index measured in London.
64 The spreads between national overnight
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60. For an analysis of TARGET see Prati and Schinasi (1999) and Garber (1998).
61. For cross-border payments TARGET competes in Europe with a number of alterna-
tive clearing systems: the system of the European Bankers’Association; the Euro Access
Frankfurt system owned by the Landeszentralbank in Hessen, Germany; and the French
Paris Net Settlement system.
62. Bank of England (1999, chapter 3, paragraph 25).
63. The EONIA is calculated as a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending
transactions initiated within the euro area by a panel of ﬁfty-seven declaring banks.
64. For maturities beyond overnight, the benchmark euro interest rate and the preferred
price source for derivative contracts is the EURIBOR (measured in the euro area), whose
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of average country rates fell below 2 basis points after the ﬁrst three weeks
of EMU. All available evidence suggests that unsecured interbank rates are
well aligned across national markets, a measure of the success of EMU.
Yet not all elements of national segmentation have been removed: bid-ask
spreads remain somewhat different across countries, and in some countries
they are higher than in pre-EMU Germany.
65
The behavior of the EONIA within the interest rate corridor is plotted in
figure 1. The EONIA has often been quoted above the refi rate, possibly
because, unlike Eurosystem refinancing operations or private repo trans-
actions, interbank overnight loans are not collateralized. An alternative
explanation, especially in the early stage of EMU, is that the spread
reﬂects problems of redistribution of funds in the interbank market—large,
collateral-rich banks absorb liquidity at the Eurosystem auctions and
squeeze small banks in the unsecured market. It may also reflect a reluc-
tance to look beyond national borders for funds, possibly because of still-
insufficient cross-border credit lines supporting interbank lending in the
euro area, a legacy of the pre-EMU system.
66
One of the clearest patterns exhibited by the EONIA is the sizable
swings at the end of the reserve maintenance periods. For instance, the
EONIA collapsed toward the end of the second maintenance period on
March 23, falling as low as 2.19 percent before rebounding to a level close
to the refi rate, at the time equal to 3 percent. Similar downward spikes
occurred in July and August, and upward blips were recorded in April
and May. The sharp swings in overnight rates apparently signal difﬁculties
in managing liquidity in the euro area. For instance, in February the
EONIA jumped upward—and borrowing from the Eurosystem’s marginal
lending facility peaked—as banks scrambled to meet their reserve
requirements. 
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spread over the equivalent euro LIBOR (the London interbank offered rate) is usually within
1 basis point. 
65. Elements of market segmentation are even more evident in the secured (repo) inter-
bank market. National repo rates have largely converged in the euro area, but the develop-
ment of a single European market is undermined by the absence of links between national
securities settlement systems, hampering the cross-border use of collateral (International
Monetary Fund, 1999).
66. See International Monetary Fund (1999).
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appropriate amount of liquidity in the presence of “autonomous” factors,
especially government deposits, which inﬂuence the demand for reserves.
As late as the fifth reserve maintenance period, which ended on June 23,
the ECB estimated the net liquidity-absorbing impact of the autonomous
factors at €74.8 billion, compared with a net provision of liquidity through
open market operations of €176.7 billion. The largest liquidity-absorbing
change in treasury deposits during a reserve maintenance period stems
from the Italian tax collection scheduled on the 23rd of each month, thus
coinciding with the last day of the maintenance period.
67 In principle, the
ECB could intervene in the market to smooth interest rate swings through
fine-tuning operations. So far, however, it has decided not to do so, argu-
ing that the volatility of the EONIA at the end of the reserve maintenance
periods does not have a relevant impact on longer maturities along the
yield curve.
68
The Growth of the Private Bond Market
The introduction of the euro is expected to foster the growth of a large
market for corporate bonds and to contribute significantly to disinter-
mediation, leading to a marked reduction in the role of banks in European
corporate finance. Currently, the proportion of loans to bond financing in
Europe is estimated to be almost 3 to 1, roughly the reverse of the U.S. pat-
tern. The evidence for the first two quarters of 1999 shows a high rate of
growth of the European bond market, especially the corporate segment. If
sustained, the current rate of growth would indeed allow the corporate
bond market in Europe to bridge the gap with the United States in a mat-
ter of years. It would clearly foster the international role of the euro. But
the specific conditions prevailing at the beginning of 1999 suggest some
caveats in interpreting the data.
Evidence on the bond market is provided by Capital Data Bondware,
which calculates the overall issuance of underwritten bonds denominated
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67. See European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, July 1999, pp. 15–17.
68. In the past, some commentators have predicted that fine-tuning interventions to
smooth interest rates would be difficult to execute, among other reasons because of the
decentralized implementation of monetary policy (Centre for European Policy Studies,
1998, p. 31).
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things, equity- and warrant-linked bonds but do include government bonds
that are underwritten rather than auctioned. Total issuance of domestic and
international bonds increased from an average of €150 billion per quarter
in 1998 to €261 billion and €220 billion in the ﬁrst and the second quarters
of 1999, respectively. As mentioned above, the nonfinancial corporate
bond sector has experienced the strongest growth rate. Issues by corpora-
tions rose from an average of €8.9 billion over the four quarters of 1998
to €30 billion and €16.4 billion in the first and second quarters of 1999,
respectively. Despite the fall in absolute value between the two quarters,
the share of corporate bonds in total issuance increased from 12 percent
in the ﬁrst quarter to 16 percent in the second. The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) also reports a record volume of activity by corporate
borrowers and ascribes the bulk of the growth to European companies.
69
Can these data be interpreted as evidence of a signiﬁcant step toward a
pan-European corporate bond market and a changing pattern in European
corporate finance? Several considerations argue for caution in reaching
any conclusion in this regard. First, a close look at the data reveals that
most of the growth has come from European companies that have issued
bonds in the past, and from foreign (that is, non–euro area) issuers. In
particular, the presence of U.S. firms in the European bond market has
increased significantly. Thus the growth in the market does not, so far at
least, reﬂect a larger base of issuers. Second, part of the upsurge in the ﬁrst
months of 1999 can be attributed to the fact that some corporations (as
well as governments, as discussed in the next section) delayed and
bunched issues in anticipation of the birth of the euro. Reportedly, these
firms sought to establish a presence in the new market with large and liq-
uid issues. This explanation is consistent with the recorded increase in
the average size of issuance between 1998 and 1999. Third, some of the
growth in issuance may have been driven by the current wave of mergers
and acquisitions throughout Europe, which is magnifying the financing
needs of the corporate sector. Fourth, over the same period, bond issuance
has also increased in other currencies; it has not been a speciﬁc feature of
the euro area. 
To some extent, corporations may have been encouraged to resort to the
euro bond market by the sharp drop in yield spreads across countries at the
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69. Bank for International Settlements (1999).
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 323birth of the euro. The drop occurred in a context of generalized low yields,
which were expected to reduce the traditional resistance of European
investors to low-rated bonds as a way to seek better returns. (Indeed, the
available evidence records an increase in the issuance of low-rated bonds.)
Low yields at the beginning of the year may also explain the boom in the
issuance of Pfandbriefe, the fully collateralized bonds issued by specially
authorized German banks to fund housing, shipbuilding, and public loans.
With an outstanding stock of €930 billion at the end of 1998, Pfandbriefe
are the largest nongovernment asset class in Europe, far larger than the
stock of any European national government debt. New issues of Pfand-
briefe in the ﬁrst quarter of 1999 exceeded €99 billion; they then dropped
to €33 billion in the second quarter, possibly reﬂecting the upward adjust-
ment in long-term interest rates. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the weight of bond issuance by banks,
although falling, remains very large compared with that by nonfinancial
corporations. Indeed, bank issues dominate the market with approximately
two-thirds of total issuance. According to the BIS, the first quarter of 1999
also recorded a large increase in bank lending. After a contraction of $126
billion in 1998, for instance, international bank lending in euros climbed
to $337 billion in the ﬁrst quarter of 1999.
70 Not only have European banks
added to their portfolios of European debt securities (largely buying up
government issues, as discussed in the next section), but they have also
been major players in ﬁnancing mergers and acquisitions. 
Public Debt Management in a Common Currency Area
Following the birth of the euro, government debt previously denomi-
nated in national currency has been converted into the new common cur-
rency. With an outstanding stock of about €3 trillion, euro-denominated
government bonds make up the world’s largest market for government
bonds, larger even than the corresponding U.S. market. However, Euro-
pean government bonds are issued by eleven independent sovereign states,
with different financial needs, fiscal policies, and regulations. The birth
of the euro has therefore raised interesting and unprecedented issues in
324 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
70. See Bank for International Settlements (1999, p. 10).
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inated an important differentiating feature in the supply of debt instru-
ments, thus forcing European governments to rethink their financial
policies. And by speeding up the process of market integration, a com-
mon currency has increased the potential demand for national bonds, but it
has also intensiﬁed competition among sovereign issuers, providing strong
incentives for them to reform markets and pursue greater efficiency and
transparency. The euro has also raised the question of whether and to what
extent public debt management is a matter of common concern, requiring
coordination and cooperation among European governments.
71
During the course of 1999, euro area governments are expected to issue
bonds with a face value of almost €500 billion (table 1). The three largest
players are France, Germany, and especially Italy, whose 1999 redemption
schedule is particularly heavy. New issues seem to have been front-loaded
in the first few months of the year: approximately one-third of the esti-
mated 1999 gross issuance was concentrated in the first quarter. In that
period, the volume of benchmark bonds issued by France, Germany, Italy,
and Spain often exceeded that of the U.S. Treasury benchmark. 
Despite signiﬁcant differences in ratings, yield spreads on government
bonds have been quite narrow and seem to reflect liquidity considera-
tions. Relative to ten-year German bunds, the largest spreads have not
exceeded 33 basis points. Markets seem to have focused on the fact that
deﬁcits are uniformly low in all euro area states, and to have downplayed
any risk of secession. Reportedly, the birth of the euro has indeed changed
the criteria used by rating agencies to assess sovereign risk: variables
such as trade deﬁcits, export growth, and exchange rates now receive very
little consideration; instead the focus is almost exclusively on the fiscal
stance. In part because the European SGP establishes upper limits on the
ratio of countries’overall (that is, not cyclically adjusted) national budget
deficits to GDP, even mild cyclical fluctuations of deficits toward these
limits may induce some variability in ratings and yield spreads over the
business cycle.
72
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71. A comprehensive overview and analysis of public debt management in the euro
area is provided by Piga (1999), whose discussion is based on the results of a survey of
European debt managers and market makers. Piga discusses in detail many of the issues
touched upon in this section.  
72. See, for instance, the section on sovereign debt in Deutsche Bank (1999).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 326Significant cross-border diversification of government bond holdings
has not (yet) occurred. Although hard evidence on diversiﬁcation is scarce,
the general perception is that very few investors have appreciably modiﬁed
their holdings of domestic debt. Many market participants, however,
anticipate a change in portfolio patterns as soon as European money man-
agers come to be evaluated on the basis of European performance bench-
marks rather than domestic benchmarks. 
Underlying these general features of the government bond market are
differences in the objectives and strategies pursued by national treasuries.
In the two largest countries in the union, Germany and France, debt man-
agement is largely seen as part of a general strategy to promote the
national market as a European ﬁnancial center. The immediate goal in each
country is to establish its domestic government bonds as the benchmark
for the euro area as a whole.
73To help it toward this goal, France can count
on the fruits of a decade-long effort to modernize its bond market: French
bonds are quite standardized, sufficiently liquid over a large spectrum of
maturities, and supported by a well-organized and transparent market for
repos. Their main drawback is perhaps the low liquidity of French bond
futures contracts, compared with that of bund futures contracts. To reduce
the gap with French standards, Germany has also been reforming its mar-
kets. In particular, breaking with its traditional preference for issuing debt
through syndication, Germany has recently adopted an auction system,
accessible to an “auction group” of domestic and international investors. 
In the eyes of market participants, neither the French nor the German
government is likely to become the sole provider of benchmark bonds
across the whole spectrum of maturities. In part because of the importance
of the bund futures contracts, German bunds are expected to be the Euro-
pean benchmark for the ten-year sector, whereas French issues should
dominate shorter maturities. However, which specific bonds will be
included in the set of euro benchmarks may well vary over time, depend-
ing on circumstances. Consistent with the general objective of promoting
their national markets to the status of European financial centers, France
and Germany require primary dealers in their sovereign debt to be located
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73. The benchmark interest rate is the minimum interest rate investors will demand for
investing in a nontreasury security. It is generally tied to the yield to maturity offered on a
recently issued treasury security of comparable maturity. This is referred to as an “on-the-
run” or current coupon issue or, more simply, a benchmark issue. 
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of other countries, and indeed some have actually reformed their regula-
tion to allow primary dealers to be located abroad. 
Because of their relatively low credit rating (table 2), Italian bonds
cannot compete for the status of the European benchmark. Yet the large
stock of its public liabilities gives Italy comparative advantage in terms
of liquidity, and it has exploited that advantage by resorting to “jumbo”
issues of euro-denominated ﬁxed-income conventional bonds.75
Issuing a few standard bonds in large amounts is also the dominant
strategy in other countries of the euro area, mainly because of concern
about the liquidity of their new issues, but with the related goal of mar-
keting domestic debt to nondomestic investors. As a general pattern, debt
managers have increased the size of each bond issue, while reducing diver-
siﬁcation of their supply. There are, however, differences across countries
with regard to the choice of auctions as opposed to syndication.
It is worth mentioning that European secondary markets for government
debt are to a large extent telephone-based. The exception is Italy, which
in 1988 adopted an electronic system, the MTS (Mercato Telematico dei
Titoli di Stato). Since March 1999, an expanded version of this system,
based in London and called the Euro-MTS, has been open to trade in the
largest and most liquid government bonds of France, Germany, and Italy.
By the end of October 1999, trading will also be possible in bonds of Aus-
tria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain. So far this market has been
remarkably successful. The average daily volume of trade between the end
of March and the end of June 1999 was €2.7 billion, roughly evenly
divided across French, German, and Italian bonds. In light of the experi-
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74. The regulation of primary dealers is not subject to the European Investment Service
Directive, which establishes that domestic markets can be accessed by EU ﬁnancial institu-
tions regardless of their location. A location requirement for primary dealers is therefore
lawful but in open contrast with the spirit of the directive. This is a clear indicator that Euro-
pean governments view regulation of primary dealers in public debt as a highly sensitive
political issue.
75. For instance, in May 1999 Italy sold ten-year Buoni Pluriennali del Tesoro for
€23 billion in a single issue. This is to date the largest issue in euro-denominated bonds. A
goal actively pursued by Italy in recent years has been to improve debt maturity and dura-
tion. Between July 1998 and June 1999, the average maturity of Italian public debt rose from
4.9 to 5.5 years—a level consistent with the average maturity of French and German debt.
Over the same period, the share of bonds indexed to short-term rates fell by more than 5 per-
centage points of GDP, with a significant impact on the duration of Italian debt (Republic
of Italy, 1999). Spain is also pursuing the goal of lengthening average debt maturity.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 329ence of the Euro-MTS, it is likely that new initiatives will soon speed up
profound changes in the European bond markets.
Will the euro necessarily encourage more coordination and cooperation
among public debt managers? Some have recently proposed a single debt
agency for the euro area, which would issue European debt instruments on
behalf of national governments.
76 Supporters of this idea, such as the for-
mer commissioner for monetary affairs of the European Union, stress three
motivations: the belief that both lack of coordination among national
issuers and market fragmentation are important factors hampering the
euro’s status as a reserve currency; the need to avoid congestion in Euro-
pean financial markets because of uncoordinated bunching of issues; and
the presumption that a unique agency would reduce the cost of borrowing. 
One problem with the creation of a supranational debt agency as a new
European institution is that it would require a costly process of revision
and amendment of European treaties. Moreover, the arguments presented
in favor of such an agency are unconvincing. Consider first the presump-
tion that a supranational agency would reduce the cost of borrowing. As
national issues would be lumped together, the proposed arrangement
would provide some scope for increasing the liquidity of European debt
instruments. Yet it is unlikely that financial markets would overlook the
existing differences in rating among sovereign debtors. At best, the debt
issued by a European debt agency would be rated at some average of the
underlying ratings of member states, resulting in a net gain for issuers with
low ratings and a liquidity problem. All other countries, however, would
experience a net loss. Moreover, to the extent that the issue of undifferen-
tiated European bonds is perceived to reduce transparency with respect to
the creditworthiness of the borrower, the overall cost of debt may well
increase rather than decline.
A supranational agency could also reduce competition among national
treasuries, which is now perceived as an important factor at the root of
greater innovation and efﬁciency in European ﬁnancial markets. As for the
threat of congestion, current practices in the euro area already minimize
this risk. Italy and France publish an annual calendar of issues, and Ger-
many publishes a quarterly calendar, without necessarily specifying the
exact dates of issues. 
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76. See “De Silguy Proposal May Confound Sceptics: An Agency Issuing Public Debt
for the Euro-Zone Is a Long-term Prospect,” Financial Times, August 4, 1999, p. 21. 
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likely to promote product standardization, but a market-driven trend in this
direction is already detectable. If anything, some market participants have
expressed concerns about excessive product standardization, as new issues
have largely consisted of standard fixed-income bonds. In contrast, the
supply of indexed bonds, for instance, has fallen markedly. Finally, a Euro-
pean debt agency could reduce the market power of primary dealers, rela-
tive to the current situation in national treasuries in which debt managers
compete against each other. 
Given that the proposal of a single debt agency has been met with wide-
spread skepticism and a variety of criticisms, it is unlikely that such an
institution will be created in the near future. Some form of coordination
may nonetheless emerge, especially if debt management ends up creating
liquidity management problems for the ECB as mentioned above.
77 A
notable example of an institution engaged in coordinating debt issues is the
German Committee for Public Sector Credit Issue, which ensures full
cooperation among the Ministry of Finance, the governments of the
Länder (German states), and the Bundesbank, as well as other public and
local institutions. 
The Equity Market and the Demand for Diversiﬁcation
Given the scant evidence available thus far, the impact of the euro on
equity markets is harder to assess than that on the bond markets. The con-
siderable uncertainty about the new economic environment has encour-
aged a thorough review of equity portfolio strategies and risk exposure
by both individuals and institutional investors. Whereas currency risk has
disappeared in the euro area, country risk clearly has not. Not only fiscal
and regulatory policies but also labor markets and financial systems dif-
fer across member states. As discussed below, there is no presumption
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77. The ECB provides a regularly updated report on the effects of national treasuries’
activities related to liquidity. Countries are classiﬁed in three groups according to the volatil-
ity and size of these effects. The first group includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, where the overnight balances on the treasury’s account
with the central bank are low or close to zero. The effect on liquidity is moderate for the sec-
ond group, including Ireland and Portugal, and considerable for Italy, Spain, and, to a
lesser extent, France. See European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, July 1999.
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Country-speciﬁc factors are therefore not likely to disappear from the port-
folio strategies pursued by investment managers.
The Bank of England reports results of a survey of continental Euro-
pean fund managers carried out in April 1999 by Merrill Lynch and Com-
pany and the Gallup Organization.
78 In this survey, one out of four
managers reported having already carried out the portfolio adjustment they
considered necessary, and another 62 percent were confident that they will
have done so by the end of the year. The marketing and investment strate-
gies pursued by investment institutions reveal interesting trends. Many of
these institutions now emphasize cross-border, sector-by-sector allocations
of portfolios. Such a strategy is supported by the creation of several pan-
European stock market indexes, including sectoral indexes. 
The eventual scope and size of the ongoing portfolio revision are
unclear. The first issue is the extent to which the euro will lead to a port-
folio reshuffling toward pan-European, rather than national, asset hold-
ing. It has been observed that eliminating currency risk could alter the
perception and deﬁnition of “domestic” assets, to include all assets denom-
inated in the common currency. Thus, for a given home bias in portfolio
formation, we should expect more cross-border equity holdings. Accord-
ing to recent estimates of equity holdings in France, Germany, Italy, Por-
tugal, and Spain, the percentage of domestic assets in the portfolios held
by residents is above 90 percent. It is noteworthy that a significant home
bias also persists in individual states of the United States, the federation
with the longest tradition of currency union, although this bias does not
approach the levels observed in Europe. The U.S. experience could pro-
vide a benchmark for assessing what could be a realistic endpoint for the
process of cross-border investment diversiﬁcation in the euro area.
79
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78. Bank of England (1999).
79. Huberman (1997, 2000) documents a significant home bias at the local level in
holdings of claims on the regional Bell operating companies (the regional telephone com-
panies spun off from the breakup of AT&T). Ellen E. Schultz (“Workers Put Too Much in
Their Employer’s Stock,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 1996, p. C1) documents that
43 percent of funds invested in deﬁned contribution pension plans is held in the employer’s
stock. Coval and Moscowitz (1997) ﬁnd that U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong pref-
erence for firms with headquarters in the area in which they themselves are based. For a
discussion see Hess and van Wincoop (2000) and Pesenti and van Wincoop (1999).
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major diversification is unlikely to occur rapidly. Other things equal,
domestic and local portfolio managers may need time to redirect their
operations toward markets where they do not have comparative analytical
advantage. In Europe there still exist considerable national differences in
fiscal, regulatory, and political systems, let alone in corporate behavior.
Moreover, the presence of capital gains taxes makes portfolio stock reshuf-
fles costly, thus favoring a gradual diversification strategy consisting of
investing only new ﬂows of funds abroad. By the same token, the portfolio
composition of existing mutual funds may be constrained by their ofﬁcial
mandates. Diversification may occur through the creation of new mutual
funds with broader mandates, rather than the redirection of existing ones.
80
Important changes are occurring in the organization and technical capa-
bilities of European markets, as exemplified by the alliance between the
Frankfurt and London stock exchanges with the goal of creating a single,
liquid market for stocks with large market capitalizations. But progress in
this area depends crucially on the removal of impediments arising from
differences in law, regulation, and tax regimes.
81 Although many consider
the number of distinct markets in the euro area excessive, it is unlikely that
domestic markets will disappear. Rather, they are likely to specialize in
medium- or low-capitalization domestic stocks, leaving the larger stocks to
a deeper pan-European market.
Banks, Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, and National Champions 
It is easy to predict that banking, the sector at the very center of the
European financial system, will also be the sector most affected by the
transformations brought about by EMU. But the direction in which conti-
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80. See Bank of England (1999) for a discussion.
81. The removal of the many obstacles hindering ﬁnancial market integration is the objec-
tive of the European Commission’s action plan for a single ﬁnancial market. This plan,
recently given high priority, aims to have most of the necessary legislation in place by 2002.
A partial listing of the plan’s agenda clearly illustrates the complexity of the task faced by
European legislators: updating the Investment Service Directive, to provide a regulatory
framework for cross-border provision of investment services (authorization, supervision,
safeguards to counter market manipulation); simplifying requirements for companies seeking
to raise capital on an EU-wide basis (especially regarding the mutual recognition of prospec-
tuses); improving the comparability of ﬁnancial information (by fostering the adoption of
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the extent to which existing differences between countries will persist. A
second is which particular model of banking will become the prevailing
one for Europe, and a third is how fast the transformation of European
banking will take place.
82
The sizable difference between continental Europe and the United
States (and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom) in the importance of
bank lending in corporate finance corresponds to a dichotomy between
models of ﬁnancial intermediation.
83 Whereas the Anglo-American model
places greater reliance on impersonal markets, the traditional European
model relies more on relationship banking. In recent years, several fac-
tors have already induced changes in these models, independently of
EMU. A leading example is provided by developments in computing and
telecommunications technology, which have undermined the very core of
the traditional European model by encouraging price competition across
a wide range of products and by reducing the relevance of historical bank-
customer relationships.
84
The key issue, then, is whether and to what extent such a dichotomy
will persist in the EMU era. Within the context of Europe’s ongoing tech-
nological and legal transformation, EMU is expected to enhance competi-
tive pressures in the European banking system. To the extent that
the disappearance of currency risk facilitates the development of pan-
334 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
international accounting standards); defining a framework for the mutual acceptance and
enforceability of cross-border collateral (at present there is a high risk of invalidation of
cross-border collateral arrangements); deﬁning a single market framework for supplementary
pension funds (rationalizing investment restrictions and simplifying cross-border activities);
eliminating cross-border tax obstacles and distortions, especially on life insurance and pen-
sion products. 
82. See Centre for Economic Policy Research (1999a).
83. In the ﬁrst half of the 1990s the share of bank loans in total debt liabilities of nonﬁ-
nancial enterprises was 80.2 percent in France, 85.1 percent in Germany, and 94.6 percent
in Italy. For comparison, the analogous shares in the United States and the United King-
dom were 32.4 percent and 49.4 percent, respectively. Small firms are not the only ones
that make extensive use of credit ﬁnancing in Europe. In 1996 the average ratio of loans to
liabilities of the German ﬁrms among the world’s 239 largest manufacturing companies was
63.2 percent; the comparable ﬁgure was 44.3 percent in France and 73.9 percent in Italy, but
only 34.1 percent in the United Kingdom and only 9.4 percent in the United States. See Cen-
tre for Economic Policy Research (1999a, paragraph 1.3).
84. See, for example, White (1998).
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tageous to issue securities rather than seek bank loans. The availability of
a wider variety of investment opportunities will provide an incentive for
European bank customers to shift funds from safe but ultimately low-
return bank deposits to higher-yielding mutual funds, employer-sponsored
thrift plans, and the like. A significant increase in households’ demand
for securities will also stem from the development of fully funded pen-
sion plans, which demographic trends and changing political postures are
fostering throughout Europe. 
The transformation of the European banking system in response to
stiffer competition presents several similarities with U.S. financial devel-
opments in the past two decades.
85 At the root of change in both regions
is the combination of technological developments, deregulation, and a
growing securities industry. In both regions the number of banks has
decreased, small banks have been hit more severely than large institutions,
and the wave of consolidation has tended to increase market concentra-
tion.
86 In both cases also, the bulk of the adjustment has occurred through
mergers and acquisitions; bankruptcies have played only a marginal role.
What distinguishes the consolidation process in Europe from that in the
United States is the fact that, in the United States, indicators of concen-
tration at the local level have slightly decreased, whereas in Europe the
concentration of banking activity at both the national and the local levels
has significantly increased. This is especially true in the smaller coun-
tries. So far, the consolidation of EU banking industries has mostly taken
place within national boundaries: out of 488 mergers and acquisitions from
1995 through the first quarter of 1998, cross-border activity accounts for
only 17.6 percent,
87 and the additional wave of mergers beginning in 1998
has strongly reinforced the pattern. In other words, European banking con-
solidation has not yet eroded the segmentation of national markets, nor has
it enhanced the internationalization of the European banking system. With
the exceptions of Ireland and Luxembourg, countries in the euro area still
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86. There are a few exceptions. In France, for instance, the asset market share of the
top ﬁve ﬁrms fell from 42.5 percent to 40.3 percent between 1990 and 1997 (European Cen-
tral Bank, Monthly Bulletin, April 1999, table 3, p. 46).
87. See European Central Bank (1999, table 8). For an analysis of the beneﬁts of merg-
ers and acquisitions see the case study by Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo (1999).
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tries below 11 percent.
88
Consolidation conﬁned to the national level raises at least two kinds of
problems. At the microeconomic level, it may reinforce the local monop-
oly power of banks, thus increasing the inefficiencies faced by borrowers
and worsening the condition of those customers, in particular small ﬁrms,
that are less likely to have access to international capital markets.
89At the
macroeconomic level, it can affect the monetary policy transmission
mechanism. For example, there is evidence that large German banks tend
to insulate their loans from monetary policy fluctuations
90—a point we
revisit below in the context of our analysis of asymmetries in Europe. But
despite these concerns, for the time being there is no sign that the bias
against cross-border bank mergers in the euro area is bound to disappear.
A variety of factors can contribute toward explaining such a bias, but
national law, regulation, and tax regimes, which de facto keep national
markets segmented, play a key role. For instance, there exists no uniform
European corporate law to provide a framework for the birth of European
(that is, transnational) firms. This is a key problem hampering cross-
national mergers of both financial and nonfinancial corporations. More-
over, as the structure of bank supervision in the euro area is decentralized,
the incentives faced by nationally based supervisors may work against
cross-border mergers. 
Bank supervision in the euro area remains organized at the national
level. Those national central banks that already had domestic supervisory
and regulatory functions in the pre-EMU era (six out of the eleven) have
retained them. In other countries such as France and Germany, supervision
and regulation reside with independent agencies in close cooperation with
the central bank. It is often argued that, as long as bank activity remains
essentially confined to the national level, supervisory tasks are not
impaired by informational problems. Difficulties in monitoring a bank’s
activity and balance sheet can, however, emerge in the case of international
banks. The desire to avoid these difﬁculties may give national supervisors
an incentive to discourage cross-border mergers—to the point of block-
ing them in countries where bank mergers require supervisory approval.
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89. See, for instance, the analysis in Centre for Economic Policy Research (1999b).
90. See, for example, Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999).
08032—BI/BPEA Corsetti  12/30/99 9:21 AM  Page 336Interestingly, a few national supervisors have recently expressed their
aversion to hostile takeovers in the process of within-border consolidation,
perhaps for fear of setting a risky precedent for future successful bids by
foreign competitors.
91 Ultimately, decentralized regulation can itself ham-
per the integration of European capital markets and impart a bias toward
“national champions,” with uncertain implications. To the extent that bank-
ing market integration can be slowed down but not halted, these national
champions may become embarrassing liabilities for national authorities. In
an integrated market, these banks will be focused too broadly at the
national level to beneﬁt from knowledge of local markets, but at the same
time too small to compete effectively with large international institutions.
There is another reason why several critics of the current regime of
decentralized supervision are concerned with its effectiveness once the
European banking market becomes more integrated. In time of crisis, a
national supervisor may not fully internalize the euro area–wide implica-
tions of its decision when facing the option of rescuing a bank located in
its own country but also operating abroad.
92 Crisis management consider-
ations thus make it likely that the emergence of European transnational
banks will lead to some centralization in supervision. Currently, national
supervisors cooperate with each other on a bilateral basis, according to a
memorandum of understanding among EU countries that regulates the
exchange of information and provides for periodic meetings, without,
however, being legally binding. There are also two multilateral forums: the
Banking Supervision Committee of the ECB and the lower-level Groupe
de Contact. 
Early on, critics questioned the ability of the new EMU institutions to
cope with financial crises in a timely and effective manner.
93 Since the
launch of the euro, however, the ECB has replied to these criticisms by
clarifying Eurosystem procedures for crisis management. Provision of
emergency liquidity is a national responsibility, and its costs are to be
borne at the national level. Cooperation and exchange of information are
required for the ECB to manage the impact of emergency interventions
on the monetary stance of the euro area as a whole. An issue that remains
Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti 337
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92. See the considerations put forward by Padoa-Schioppa (1999).
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sis. On the one hand, the current segmentation in the euro area might effec-
tively contain the risk of contagion of a financial crisis erupting in one
member country. On the other hand, severe problems may be associated
with the lack of information at a central level, as well as with constraints
on the ﬂow of liquidity from one market to another.
94
The Exchange Rate of the Euro
At the onset of EMU in January, one euro was worth $1.18. By July, it
had fallen to less than $1.02—a depreciation of 13.5 percent in less than
seven months—before rebounding in the second half of the month. The
euro’s weak performance in the first half of 1999 has been cited by
euroskeptics of all stripes as reason to question whether Europe was ready
for a common currency after all. In our view, the slide of the euro has
attracted a share of public attention much beyond its importance, in either
macroeconomic or policy terms. Our analysis of the market for euro-
denominated bonds suggests that the weakness of the euro in the ﬁrst half
of the year does not appear to have undermined the international role of the
new currency. A “continuing buoyancy of issuance in euros despite the
unfavourable background of euro weakness”
95 was a striking feature of
international capital markets in the ﬁrst two quarters of 1999.
To put the recent behavior of the euro in historical perspective, fig-
ure 2 plots the exchange rate of the “synthetic euro” (a weighted basket
of the currencies of the EMU member states) against the dollar over the
1990s. Three points emerge. First, to focus on recent events, the euro’s
slide in 1999 (more precisely, since the last quarter of 1998) appears as the
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94. On these issues see International Monetary Fund (1999).
95. Bank for International Settlements (1999, p. 17). For a discussion of the international
role of the euro see, among others, European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin,August 1999,
and Rogoff (1998). Portes and Rey (1998) argue that under a “big euro” scenario in which
the euro replaces the dollar as the main international currency for cross-Atlantic financial
transactions, Europe would reap a gain equivalent to 0.2 percent of GDP (as a ﬂow). Mean-
while the United States would lose 0.04 percent of GDP and Japan 0.07 percent.  The gains
for Europe would come mainly from decreasing costs on its bond markets. The losses for the
United States and Japan come from foreign exchange market transactions, since both coun-
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pensation” (to quote ECB President Duisenberg) for the rise in the value of
the component currencies before EMU. Second, taking a longer-term per-
spective, the frequent swings of the synthetic euro against the dollar over
the 1990s have been equal to or larger than the 1999 slide. Third, these
ﬂuctuations have occurred around a slowly declining trend. From this van-
tage point, the level of the euro in the summer of 1999 was consistent
with its low-frequency history. If anything, it is the value of the synthetic
euro in the months preceding the launch of EMU that stands out as being
well above its trend. 
Over the ﬁrst half of 1999, the euro also weakened signiﬁcantly against
the yen, although in a tighter range than against the dollar. In response to
the strength of the yen, the Bank of Japan reportedly intervened on
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Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
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rency market intervention, acted on behalf of the Bank of Japan to weaken
the Japanese currency against the euro.
96
Commentators have cited a host of factors to “explain” the behavior of
the euro over the first months of 1999, ranging from the delayed effects
of the Asian crisis to uncertainties created by the Balkan war. However, the
focus has mostly been on two factors: concerns over fiscal profligacy on
the part of some EMU members, and cyclical divergence between the euro
area and U.S. economies.
97 In retrospect—and to the extent that short-term
macroeconomic analysis of exchange rate ﬂuctuations makes any sense at
all—the first of the two factors appears to have played only a marginal
role, whereas the second appears to have been decisive. 
There has been one speciﬁc episode in which the weakness of the euro
was clearly associated with fiscal problems.
98 This occurred when a revi-
sion in growth forecasts led the Italian treasury minister to request a relax-
ation of the Italian deficit goal for 1999 to 2.4 percent of GDP from the
previous 2.0 percent. This modification was granted on May 27 by the
Ecoﬁn Council ministers.
99 The euro reached what was up to that point an
all-time low of $1.04 the next day, prompting analysts to express their con-
cern that individual member states were easing their deficit targets, and
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96. In terms of volumes, data released by the Japanese Ministry of Finance show that,
between January 1998 and January 1999, Japanese investors purchased roughly ¥7.3 trillion
(more than $61 billion) worth of European debt. Of these euro-denominated positions, a sig-
niﬁcant ¥568 billion worth was liquidated in February and March, contributing to the weak-
ness of the euro. Interestingly, the trend has reversed since then. By June 1999 cumulative
Japanese net purchases of euro-denominated debt since January 1998 were up to a stagger-
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97. See Buiter (1999a) for a presentation and discussion of the different arguments.
98. The link between ﬁscal problems and euro weakness was most explicitly suggested
by the ECB president in the aftermath of the surprise resignation of German Finance Min-
ister Oskar Lafontaine on March 11: “the possibility cannot be excluded that increased
uncertainty about the political support for a stability-oriented monetary and ﬁscal policy has
contributed to the weakening of the euro.” See Wim Duisenberg, “The Euro, the Dollar and
National Economic Policies: What Room for Manoeuvre?” speech at the Euro, J+80 con-
ference, Paris, March 25, 1999. 
99. The Ecoﬁn Council is composed of the ministers of ﬁnance and economy of the EU
member states. It is responsible for deciding legislation regarding tax harmonization, ﬁnan-
cial liberalization, and economic policy. The council makes the final decision on many
aspects of EMU, and it was on the basis of an Ecoﬁn report that the EU heads of state and of
government decided which countries qualiﬁed for monetary union. 
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unanticipated growth slowdown, the Italian request was not unreason-
able: no revision would have been necessary had deﬁcit targets been speci-
fied in cyclically adjusted terms. At any rate, the impact of this episode
on the external performance of the euro was ephemeral. It is worth stress-
ing that a larger combined ﬁscal deﬁcit in the euro area could weaken the
euro only if the ECB were expected to accommodate it through monetary
relaxation, and that would be tantamount to questioning the ECB’s com-
mitment to its institutional mandate.101
Fiscal factors notwithstanding, the most convincing interpretation iden-
tifies the root cause of the euro’s slide as differences in the phase of the
business cycle between the European economy and economies elsewhere.
To some extent, the slide of the euro represents a textbook case of
exchange rate adjustment in response to a perceived shift in economic fun-
damentals. Figure 3 plots revisions over time in expectations for the 1999
growth differential between the euro area and the United States, as mea-
sured by Consensus Forecasts.102 The data provide preliminary but com-
pelling evidence that the timing and magnitude of the shifts in relative
growth expectations were consistent with the behavior of the euro.
During the first nine months of 1998, the forecasters surveyed in Con-
sensus Forecasts expected the growth differential to swing in Europe’s
favor, with Europe growing about 0.6 percentage point faster than the
United States in 1999. During this period, the European currencies that are
components of the synthetic euro appreciated rapidly. By late 1998, as
the European recovery stalled and the U.S. economy continued its strong
performance, these forecasters still expected the growth differential to
reverse in 1999. As recently as the fourth quarter of 1998, they projected
that Europe would be growing 0.3 percentage point faster than the United
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being revised downward and those for the United States upward. By the
middle of the second quarter of this year, forecasters were expecting U.S.
growth to outpace European growth by over 1.5 percentage points. In sum,
the euro’s slide was a clear reflection of the ratcheting down of expected
growth differentials during the ﬁrst half of 1999. Conversely, the upswing
of the euro in July was related to an improvement in the expected relative
growth performance of the euro area. Among the key elements coinciding
with the sudden rebound of the euro was the July release of better-than-
expected business surveys from France, Germany, and Italy pointing to a
recovery in European industrial production.
Has the euro’s slide been good news for Europe? Arguably yes, by pro-
viding a cyclical stimulus and counteracting transitory weaknesses of the
European economies through a rebound in export orders. To quantify this
sort of stimulus, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment presents estimates of the responses of GDP growth and inﬂation to
a sustained 10 percent decline in the effective value of the euro. According
to these estimates, such a depreciation would add more than 
1⁄2 percentage
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Figure 3. Revisions in Expectations of the Euro Area–U.S. Growth Differential, and
the Dollar-Euro Exchange Rate, 1998–99
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Source: Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics, London) and European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
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centage point after two years. The cost of this boost to growth is a 0.6-
percentage-point increment to inflation, felt in the first year.
103 In the
current economic environment, with euro area inﬂation running near 1 per-
cent, such a rise would leave inﬂation still below the 2 percent upper limit
for the range that the ECB regards as price stability.
The Eurosystem deliberately does not specify any target for the
exchange rate of the euro. The argument is that price stability would be
compromised if an exchange rate target were to be pursued. Others, how-
ever, argue that the relaxed attitude of the ECB to the euro’s slide repre-
sents an element of discontinuity in European monetary policy from its
Bundesbank-dominated past. An important consideration helps understand
this apparent departure. Before EMU, fluctuations in cross-Atlantic
exchange rates had an impact on intra-European exchange rates and were
a major source of destabilizing pressures. This empirical regularity was
referred to as the dollar–deutsche mark polarization: when the dollar
strengthened against the mark, currencies such as the French franc and
the Italian lira tended to appreciate against the mark as well. Downward
swings of the dollar were particularly problematic: almost all realignments
in the EMS were preceded by a fall in the effective dollar index and were
followed by a recovery of the dollar.
104 Other episodes of strain in the EMS
were associated with swings in the dollar exchange rate, and the crisis of
September 1992 that led to the exit of the lira and the pound sterling from
the EMS was preceded in the summer by a dollar crisis. Today, the risk that
cross-Atlantic exchange rate fluctuations will have any impact on intra-
European exchange rates has disappeared (with the notable exception of
the exchange rate between the pound sterling and the euro). Other things
being equal, the ECB can afford to adopt a more detached attitude toward
exchange rate ﬂuctuations than would have been possible in the past. 
The ECB does not appear to have espoused the case for explicit sup-
port of a strong euro. However, consistent with the second pillar of the
monetary strategy, the ECB does monitor exchange rate developments
with regard to their impact on prospective price developments. As ECB
Executive Board member Otmar Issing has said, “If a prolonged depreci-
ation, for example, were to lead to significant inflationary risks in the
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respond.”
105The vagueness of the ECB pronouncements—clearly,no estimate
of the elasticity of the HICP to a depreciation is provided—potentially
leaves open all courses of action short of explicit exchange rate targeting.
Over the first months of 1999, these ambiguities fostered concern over
the possibility that the ECB would intervene in currency markets or raise
interest rates to keep the euro from falling below parity with the dollar.
106
An element of concern in assessing future developments in the euro
exchange rate stems from Article 109 of the Maastricht Treaty. According
to that provision, the EU Council of Ministers may “conclude formal
agreements on an exchange rate system for the ECU in relation to non-
Community currencies,” although in doing so it must be acting unani-
mously on a recommendation from the ECB or from the European
Commission. The council also has the right to “formulate general orien-
tations for exchange-rate policy,” in this case acting by a qualiﬁed major-
ity on a recommendation from the ECB or from the Commission.
107
Although the treaty expressly rules out exchange rate initiatives inconsis-
tent with price stability, Article 109 raises the possibility of conflict
between the ECB and parts of the European policy establishment regard-
ing exchange rate orientations. Such a conflict emerged in the spring of
1999, when a number of European policymakers proposed—unsuccess-
fully—different plans to implement exchange rate target zones among the
key currencies, in some cases explicitly referring to Article 109 of the
treaty. It is worth stressing that on December 13, 1997, the European
Council agreed to limit the provision of exchange rate orientations to
“exceptional circumstances” and to “respect the independence of the
Eurosystem.” But the meaning of “exceptional” remains undefined, and
344 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
105. Otmar Issing, “The Euro—A Stable Currency for Europe,” speech to the SUERF
conference,Athens, June 10, 1999, p. 22. 
106. See, for example, Krugman (1999). The closest these fears came to being vali-
dated was at the time of the currency intervention of June 18, when the ECB sold yen against
euros on behalf of the Bank of Japan. Although technically acting as an agent of a Japa-
nese central bank concerned with the excessive strengthening of the yen, the ECB appeared
to be killing two birds with one stone. 
107. See the discussion in Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini (1993); Buiter (1999b); and
Svensson (1999).
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discretion of the Council of Ministers. Ultimately, the clause gives the euro
area finance ministers, as Willem Buiter writes, “a foot in the door of
Euro area monetary policy design.”
108 It may also represent a threat to the
independence of the EMU institutions.
109
The Asymmetric EMU
For most critics of European monetary integration in the pre-euro days,
the major argument against a common currency hinged on the view that
Europe was significantly more heterogeneous than the United States, and
therefore more vulnerable to country-speciﬁc shocks, which could be best
dealt with by letting exchange rates change. The creation of EMU has
ended the policy debate on whether Europe could afford to give up
exchange rate flexibility, without necessarily implying, however, that the
issues and concerns raised during the debate have been answered. 
To start with, notable differences in growth performance have recently
emerged from a two-year recovery phase in the euro area as a whole.
According to recent calculations by the ECB, the increase in growth dis-
persion reflects to a large extent differences in trend growth rates.
110At the
root of recent divergences in trend growth is the remarkable performance
of Ireland, Finland, and the Netherlands and the decline of Italy. Ireland’s
trend growth rate between 1994 and 1998 was a staggering 9.2 percent a
year, and those of Finland and the Netherlands were above 3 percent,
whereas Italy’s trend growth rate was as low as 1.3 percent. (The annual
trend growth rate for the euro area as a whole, for comparison, was 2.3 per-
cent.) Similar patterns emerge for employment and for growth in industrial
production. 
The ECB study also provides evidence of synchronization of shorter-
term cyclical developments, as measured by the correlation of cyclical
components of GDP growth in individual countries with those in the euro
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decompositions, two observations are appropriate. First, this kind of analy-
sis cannot detect the nature of the shocks underlying cyclical movements.
The theory of optimal currency areas, for instance, suggests that giving
up exchange rate ﬂexibility is costly, in terms of output stabilization, only
in the presence of asymmetric real shocks. The overall degree of syn-
chronization is not necessarily informative about the frequency and mag-
nitude of these shocks relative to financial shocks. Second, the evidence
shows that synchronization diminishes dramatically in the presence of eas-
ily identiﬁable, large asymmetric shocks, such as that associated with Ger-
man unification. As suggested by our previous work on the subject,112 the
1992–93 EMS crisis serves as a sober reminder of the destabilizing poten-
tial of policy conﬂicts that may arise in those (luckily rare) circumstances. 
Whatever the nature of the shocks that do occur, an increase over time
in the degree of cyclical synchronization cannot but represent good news
for the ECB, by reducing the scope for political dissonance on its policy
stance. Will regional divergences in the euro zone in fact become less
pronounced over time? One thesis is that this will be a result of the com-
mon currency. The argument is that the elimination of exchange rate risk
and the development of an integrated market for securities will provide
growing opportunities to diversify portfolios, stimulate trade, and enhance
integration. An extreme version of this view holds that, ultimately, the euro
area will endogenously become an optimum currency area even if it is not
one currently.113 A different thesis, drawing lessons from the U.S. experi-
ence, holds that cyclical synchronization cannot be expected to stem from
monetary reform per se.114 Structural economic features play a much big-
ger role. 
Recently, EMU watchers have focused on a different dimension of eco-
nomic asymmetry in Europe. Because of differences in the way banking
and financial intermediaries operate in the euro area countries, the argu-
ment goes, there could be some heterogeneity in national mechanisms of
transmission of ECB monetary policy. Thus a centralized policy impulse
346 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
111. Angeloni and Dedola (1999) provide evidence on the role played by coordination of
monetary policy (either formal or informal) in inducing convergence in cyclical and infla-
tion movements over the 1990s.
112. See Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998a).
113. See Frankel and Rose (1998); Frankel (1999).
114. See Clark and van Wincoop (1999).
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states. This issue has potentially far-reaching implications for the conduct
of ECB policy, especially if the United Kingdom and the other current
nonmember countries in the European Union join EMU.
115
Consider, for instance, the “textbook” interest rate channel of mone-
tary transmission, according to which monetary policy modiﬁes the cost of
capital and borrowing conditions, thus affecting demand for durables con-
sumption and investment. Three factors could generate asymmetries in this
mechanism across countries. 
The first consists of differences in the diffusion of consumer borrow-
ing—borrowing that increases the sensitivity of consumption to interest
rates, and therefore magniﬁes the impact of monetary policy on aggregate
demand. In light of this consideration, we should expect interest rate
movements to have a stronger impact in the Nordic countries and the
United Kingdom than in Belgium, France, and Italy. In the first group of
countries, the use of consumer credit is widespread, and the ratio of ﬁnan-
cial liabilities to disposable income is around 100 percent (for comparison,
the corresponding ratio in the United States is 90 percent). The opposite
pattern characterizes the second group of countries, where the ratio of
households’ financial liabilities to disposable income is much lower,
between 30 and 50 percent. The second asymmetry reﬂects differences in
the level of public debt, a key determinant of net interest income as a share
of disposable income. By increasing the interest income of households,
an interest rate hike in high-debt countries may actually raise rather than
reduce spending. The third asymmetry arises from differences in the per-
centage of short-term (or ﬂoating-rate) debt in private sector ﬁnancial lia-
bilities. For instance, households’ borrowing in the United Kingdom and
Italy is largely short-term or indexed to short-term rates, whereas short-
term borrowing by ﬁrms is sizable, relative to that in other European coun-
tries, in Belgium, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Combining these
three factors, monetary policy (through the interest rate channel) could be
expected to be particularly effective in the United Kingdom, and relatively
ineffective in France. Italy is a mixed case, as the effects just described
may partly offset each other.
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transmission of monetary policy, according to which a liquidity squeeze
that reduces the supply of bank loans is more effective, the lower the sub-
stitutability of bond issuance for bank credit.
116 The focus is on the devel-
opment of markets for loans as an alternative to bank credit. On these
grounds, there is an apparent divergence between continental Europe,
where the share of bank loans in total debt liabilities is high, and the
United Kingdom, where this share is only 50 percent (compared with
30 percent in the United States). Credit channel theories also suggest that
monetary policy is more effective, the higher the proportion of small ﬁrms
and small banks. The reason is that smaller firms are more likely to be
liquidity constrained and depend on banks for their financing, whereas
smaller banks are less likely to use bond holdings as a buffer to insulate
their loan portfolios.
117
Finally, there are striking national differences in the timing of the
response of bank lending rates to changes in key interest rates. This
response is rather fast in the United Kingdom, because of the presence of
competitive securities markets, but slow in countries where banks value
long-term relationships with customers, as such banks may be less prone
to transfer interest rate shocks to borrowers. In Germany, for instance, it
takes one calendar quarter for bank rates to adjust by 36 basis points in
response to a 1-percentage-point permanent change in key interest rates,
and the adjustment is incomplete even after one year. Adjustment is even
slower in France, where interest rates adjust by only 60 basis points after
one year.
118 The credit channel is also to be considered particularly impor-
tant in Italy (where nonbank ﬁnance is virtually unavailable, and the small-
firm sector is large), but unimportant in the United Kingdom (for the
opposite reasons). France is somewhat similar in this respect to Italy; Bel-
gium and the Netherlands are similar to the United Kingdom; and Ger-
many is somewhere in between. 
At this stage, it is difﬁcult to assess the practical relevance of these con-
siderations. On the basis of the evidence on the features of national ﬁnan-
cial markets, one might expect monetary policy to have a somewhat
homogeneous impact in France, Germany, and Spain. In Italy a weak inter-
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116. See Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992); Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
117. See Kashyap and Stein (1997).
118. See Bank for International Settlements (1995).
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opposite is true for the United Kingdom. The econometric evidence is
mixed. Some models suggest that monetary policy has the strongest
impact on output in the United Kingdom and Italy, and the weakest in
Spain, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. The impact on inﬂation
is large in Belgium and Italy, but negligible in Austria. Conversely, vector
autoregressive (VAR) models detect differences in national responses to a
monetary shock, but these differences tend not to be large. The impact
from monetary shocks tends to be similar in France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, small in Spain, and large in Sweden and Italy.
119
It has been argued that these asymmetries will tend to disappear with
the development of deeper pan-European ﬁnancial markets, and that a nec-
essary condition for this to happen is the dismantling of regulatory and
political barriers to cross-border mergers, particularly among banks. How-
ever, even if this condition is satisﬁed, national asymmetries may not dis-
appear quickly, to the extent that they are related to structural differences
among national financial markets, such as discrepancies in legal structures
or bankruptcy law.
120
Consider ﬁnally the extent of price asymmetries in EMU. Figure 4 plots
recent trends in an index of dispersion of inflation rates among the euro
countries, as reported by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European
Communities.
121 It is apparent that the trend reduction of inﬂation dispersion
in the 1990s bottoms out in the first half of 1997. Most of the subsequent
rebound can be explained by the acceleration of services prices in fast-
growing countries such as Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain, together with divergent behavior of the most volatile compo-
nents of the consumer price index. With the important exception of Italy,
inflation has been above the euro area average in those countries with
higher growth rates. Differences in core inflation across countries shrink
until the second half of 1998 and rebound afterward, although to a lesser
extent than differences in overall consumer price index performance. 
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119. See Bank for International Settlements (1995); Gerlach and Smets (1995); Barran,
Coudert, and Mojon (1997); Britton and Whitley (1997); Dornbusch, Favero, and Giavazzi
(1998); Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998).
120. See Cecchetti (1999).
121. The dispersion indexes are computed as simple averages of the deviations in
absolute value from the euro area mean and plotted as three-quarter moving averages. Data
for Luxembourg are excluded. See also Bank of Italy, Bollettino Economico 32, February
1999, pp. 34–35.
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in the price level, both in the aggregate and disaggregated by goods cate-
gory, updated to 1996. The analysis of this evidence is relevant to monetary
policy early in the life of EMU especially, when relative prices may move
significantly in response to the new economic environment, affecting the
rate of inflation directly and indirectly through possible repercussions on
wages. Differences in the consumer price index reﬂect a variety of factors:
transportation costs, indirect taxes, market segmentation, and search costs
may hamper convergence in the prices of tradables, whereas income lev-
els, as a proxy for productivity in the tradables sector, as well as the degree
of labor market integration, inﬂuence the relative price of nontradables. 
Differences within Europe in the level of prices are large (see ﬁgure 5).
For example, in 1996 the German consumer price index was 32 percent
higher than that in Italy. Although to some extent these differences reﬂect
differences in GDP per capita, there is a striking degree of homogeneity
among Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
122
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Source:Authors’calculations based on Eurostat Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices.
a. The dispersion index is computed as the simple average of the deviation in absolute value from the euro area mean, and plot-
ted as a three-quarter moving average. Data for Luxembourg are excluded.
122. See Bank of Italy (1999, p. 77).
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gration that the continental part of northern Europe has already achieved,
relative to the rest of the euro area. Preliminary work on disaggregated
price indexes by the Bank of Italy shows, reassuringly, that the dispersion
of prices of tradable goods is lower than that of the prices of services. It
also shows that the dispersion of prices of both tradables and nontrad-
ables fell noticeably between 1990 and 1993 but remained stable between
1994 and 1996.
123 This is prima facie evidence of the effects of the
exchange rate crisis in 1992–93 on relative price adjustment in Europe, a
topic that merits further consideration. The open issue is to what extent the
introduction of the euro will further reduce differences in tradables prices.
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Figure 5. Price Levels in the EU Countries, 1996






















Source: Bank of Italy (1999) and Eurostat data.
123. See Buttiglione and Veronese (1999).
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Within the framework of the Treaty of Amsterdam, budgetary policy
lies exclusively within the purview of the member states of EMU. How-
ever, the set of rules and coordinating procedures included in the SGP limit
the conduct of national fiscal policies in the euro area.
124 Ultimately, the
budgetary rules hinge upon the basic principle that EMU member states
shall avoid excessive government deﬁcits and shall commit themselves to
a medium-term objective close to budget balance or surplus. 
In general, a national government deficit is deemed excessive if it is
above 3 percent of GDP, and government debt is excessive if it is above
60 percent of GDP. These rules admit a few exceptions,
125 and the complex
procedure used to ascertain whether a country is running an excessive
deﬁcit involves, among other things, a qualiﬁed majority vote in the Ecoﬁn
Council. In practice, these elements may make the application of the
excessive deﬁcit procedure less automatic upon crossing the deﬁcit thresh-
old than it may appear.
126
No one would challenge the general principle that sound public ﬁnances
are a prerequisite for the stability of a monetary union. What is contro-
versial is whether the specific rules of the SGP represent the most appro-
priate way to promote and enforce ﬁscal discipline. Several commentators
have argued that the deficit limits in the SGP, which are not cyclically
adjusted, do not provide sufficient flexibility to cope with cyclical down-
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124. The SGP consists of three documents. The first is a Resolution of the European
Council (passed in Amsterdam on June 17, 1997), in which the commitments of the mem-
ber states, the European Commission, and the European Council are explicitly speciﬁed. The
other two are Ecofin Council Regulations of July 7, 1997, which clarify the implementa-
tion of the excessive deﬁcit procedure and provide guidance on surveillance. 
125. A deficit-GDP ratio over 3 percent is not deemed excessive if it has declined sub-
stantially and continuously and reached a level close to 3 percent. Similarly, the stock of
debt is not considered excessive if its ratio to GDP is diminishing and approaching the ref-
erence value at a satisfactory pace. Also, a deficit above 3 percent of GDP is not excessive
if it is expected to be temporary and has occurred under exceptional circumstances such as
a severe economic downturn. For a detailed account see European Central Bank, Monthly
Bulletin, May 1999.
126. If evidence of an excessive deficit is found, the country is expected to undertake
appropriate corrective action. If it does not, ﬁnancial sanctions in the form of nonremuner-
ated deposits, from a minimum of 0.2 percent of GDP to a maximum of 0.5 percent, are
imposed, under Article 104c of the treaty. These deposits are converted into a fine if the
excessive deﬁcit is not corrected after two years; otherwise they are returned to the country. 
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It is also argued that deficit limits cannot be used as a substitute for pol-
icy coordination and that, by focusing exclusively on the size of fiscal
imbalances, the SGP overlooks the composition of budgets. Recent stud-
ies, however, provide empirical evidence that fiscal adjustments that rely
primarily on cuts in transfers and public wages are more successful in
leading to persistent deficit reduction than are adjustments based on tax
increases and cuts in public investment. According to these studies, cuts
in transfers and wages may also actually have an expansionary macro-
economic impact in the short run.128 Moreover, it may well be that, in the
practical implementation of the excessive deﬁcit procedure, public invest-
ment will be given a different weight than public consumption and trans-
fers, in light of their different impacts on future budget deficits and
ﬁnancial stability.
Are any EMU countries at risk of transgressing the SGP thresholds
and running excessive deficits? Figure 6 plots official forecasts over the
period 1999–2002 for the official government balance as a percentage of
GDP in the EU countries, based on the ﬁscal consolidation programs of the
members, both inside and outside the euro area.129 Figure 7 does the same
for public debt-GDP ratios. These ratios are reported in the May 1999
issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. Three points are worth emphasiz-
ing. First, all countries expect to remain well within the SGP threshold
for excessive deficits, but the largest economies of the euro area forecast
medium-term deficits that fall short of a balanced budget or surplus. The
forecast deficits for the three largest countries are 1 percent in Germany
in 2002, 0.8 percent in France in 2002, and 1 percent in Italy in 2001.
Second, debt-GDP ratios are expected to fall slowly for all EMU countries,
but those of Belgium, Italy, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands will
remain above the reference value of the SGP. Third, the EU members cur-
rently outside EMU (Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom)
expect to perform well in terms of the SGP criteria, with the notable excep-
tion of debt performance in Greece. 
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127. Recent contributions on the costs and beneﬁts of the SGP and the macroeconomic
effects of fiscal consolidation include Beetsma and Uhlig (1997); Buiter, Corsetti, and
Roubini (1993); Casella (1999); Chari and Kehoe (1998); Corsetti and Pesenti (1999);
De Grauwe (1998); and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998). 
128. See, for instance, Alesina and Perotti (1996).
129. The programs are described online at ue.eu.int/emu/convergence/main.htm.
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euro area–wide interest rates (and thus reduced interest payments), con-
tinuing political support for ﬁscal adjustment, and growth near potential. If
the last assumption turns out to be excessively optimistic, and as a result
some countries exceed the reference values of the SGP, the key unknown
is the extent to which the Ecofin Council will allow for cyclical contin-
gencies in assessing whether current deﬁcits are excessive.
Taken at face value, the data suggest that fiscal consolidation in
Europe—and especially in the core countries of EMU—should be expected
to proceed at a somewhat relaxed pace. As most countries expect to
approach the balanced-budget target only at the end of the forecasting hori-
zon, there is virtually no room for emergency budgetary responses to un-
anticipated contingencies. The ECB describes the prevailing approach to
354 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999






























Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, May 1999, except for the recently downgraded official forecast for Italy in
1999.
130. European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, May 1999, p. 59. 
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view, attempting to comply with the letter of the SGP while ignoring its
spirit.131 It has been correctly observed that the real problems lie ahead, with
demographic trends expected to increase pension and health expenditure by
about 7 percent of GDP between now and 2030. However, several European
economies that have already undergone a process of consolidation to meet
the convergence criteria required to qualify for EMU membership have also
experienced a severe growth slowdown and a plunge of industrial confi-
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131. In partial support of this interpretation, the record shows a substantial use of cos-
metic measures to push deﬁcits below 3 percent of GDP. These include the postponement of
cash outﬂows in a variety of ways. Before 1998, for instance, public pensions in Italy were
paid every two months. Thus the December payment included pension payments due in Jan-
uary of the following year. By switching to monthly payments, the Italian government
engineered a one-time (but only cosmetic) drop in the budget deﬁcit. Also, the use of deriv-
atives allows debt managers to reduce the ﬂow of interest payments—a point contested by
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may be for these countries the only feasible option.
Conclusion
At the end of our review of the new economic and financial landscape
that is emerging in Europe, and of the policy debate accompanying the
ongoing changes, three considerations stand out. First, after many decades
of experimentation in monetary cooperation, EMU has been heralded as
the endpoint of Europe’s long-lasting quest for financial stability and the
catalyst for its further economic integration. If one has to judge by its early
performance, EMU is indeed delivering on its promises. The switch to a
common currency has apparently enhanced market integration, as wit-
nessed by the smooth and swift takeoff of a pan-European money market
as well as by the growth of the euro bond market. Despite the many con-
cerns expressed in the past, the historical break induced by the creation
of the euro and the changeover process have not brought about ﬁnancial or
systemic instability. 
Second, despite these positive elements, the fact remains that EMU was
born in a context of substantial market segmentation, regional economic
diversity, and ﬁscal heterogeneity, let alone cultural, legal, and institutional
diversity. Traces of national segmentation appear even in the most inte-
grated market, that for overnight liquidity, and the extent of home bias
becomes increasingly predominant as one moves from the bond and equity
markets to the banking system. The elimination of currency risk and a
common monetary stance may well contribute to diminishing the asym-
metries in the euro area over time. But all available evidence suggests that,
in the foreseeable future, market segmentation and national divergences
are likely to provide the context for monetary policy. Apart from consid-
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Piga (1999). Taking advantage of low interest rates in 1999, some governments have offered
to exchange low-coupon for high-coupon bonds. These exchange offers resulted in a
decrease in the interest payment, at the expense of an increase in the stock of government
liabilities. Of course, these measures cannot affect the fiscal stance in the long run, but
they are crucial in giving national governments breathing space in the short run. In a world
of second best, they may even be beneﬁcial, to the extent that they result in a more sensible
application of the SGP. 
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cycles and the effectiveness of a centralized policy in the presence of
regional disparities, the ECB faces the issue of possible regional asym-
metries in the transmission of its monetary policy. Absent effective col-
laboration among supervisory agencies, there is also a risk that the new
system may reinforce national asymmetries, for instance by imparting a
bias against cross-border mergers in the banking sector. 
Third, the monetary strategy chosen by the Eurosystem has raised sev-
eral complaints about its degree of transparency, the effectiveness of its
communication strategy, and its accountability. Yet the short track record
of the new institution suggests that, on the ﬁeld, its choices have been the
right ones. Thus far, the Eurosystem has pursued its mandate in a balanced
way, respecting its anti-inflationary objective while adopting monetary
policies that are appropriate for the cyclical conditions of the euro area.
In particular, despite heavy criticism, the Eurosystem’s posture of detach-
ment from exchange rate management can be seen ex post as a key element
in halting the economic slowdown and facilitating recovery in Europe.
Addendum
On November 4, 1999, while this paper was in press, the ECB raised
its interest rates by 50 basis points, reversing the April cut. Market partici-
pants anticipated the November hike better than they had the April cut, as
the ECB had clearly signaled its intentions in advance. Already in late
summer the ECB had stated its belief that the euro area was no longer
facing downward risks to price stability, and since the end of September
several statements by members of the council had suggested that the ECB
was about to raise interest rates. According to survey evidence, in Octo-
ber a vast majority of market analysts were indeed expecting a rate
increase of 50 basis points in the following month.
What changed between April and November? Real economic indicators
and inﬂation data show, as late as November 1999, no compelling evidence
of overheating in the euro area as a whole. However, the monetary aggre-
gate M3 (monitored by the ECB as the first pillar of its monetary strat-
egy) continued to grow at a rate exceeding the reference value. The end
of the summer saw an acceleration of M3, and between July and Septem-
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ber its average annualized monthly growth rate was up to 5.9 percent,
almost one and a half percentage points above the reference value. Credit to
the private sector also kept expanding at an annual rate exceeding 10 per-
cent. As far as the second pillar is concerned, in April the ECB read many
indicators as pointing to deflationary risks in the euro area. During the
summer, however, the ECB detected a trend reversal, based on evidence of
increasing consumer and investor confidence, rising producer prices, and
an acceleration of wage demands. Also, the ECB decision may have
reﬂected a concern about the eventual impact of the recent strong increase
in oil prices on the consumer price index.
Responding to many criticisms of the ECB for undermining the recov-
ery in the euro area, the bank presented the November hike as a move
toward a neutral, rather than a contractionary, monetary stance. However,
the ECB has not identified the level of interest rate at which its monetary
stance should be considered neutral with respect to cyclical stimulus. Hav-
ing made two 50-basis-point moves in a row, the ECB has revealed a pref-
erence for large rate adjustments, consistent with the goal of preventing
expectations of ﬁne tuning and short-term “activism.”
In ofﬁcial comments after the ECB council meetings on October 7 and
November 4, ECB President Wim Duisenberg acknowledged that the mon-
etary policy decisions at these meetings had been made by consensus,
that is, without a formal vote. But some members of the council acknowl-
edged that, on November 4, there had been a split on the size (not, how-
ever, on the desirability) of the rate increase. Shortly before the November
hike, it was reported that Duisenberg did not exclude the possibility that
the ECB’s internal inﬂation forecasts could be published, perhaps as early
as 2000. Moreover, he referred to internal inflation forecasts in the press
conference following the monetary decision on November 4. Subsequent
statements by ECB members, however, show that the consensus on pub-
lishing internal inﬂation forecasts is far from complete.
132
132. Tony Barber, “ECB: Bank Opposes Short-Term Rate Changes,” Financial Times,
November 12, 1999, p. 2. 
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Comment and 
Discussion
Alan S. Blinder: This is a thorough and thoughtful paper that probably
should not have been written—at least not yet. The reason is painfully
obvious: September 1999 is simply far too soon to appraise Europe’s new
monetary union, as Corsetti and Pesenti realize and point out several times.
I will structure my discussion around eight questions about European
Monetary Union (EMU) that were frequently posed prior to the launch of
the euro. All but the first are considered in Corsetti and Pesenti’s paper.
In each case, I will ask what we have learned from experience to date,
and in almost all cases the answer will be, not very much. Thus, what we
can do at this stage is speculate, and the authors do so intelligently.
I begin with the only three questions that we can actually answer at
this stage, and I will be very brief on two of them. The ﬁrst is an intensely
interesting question in political economy, but it chronologically precedes
this paper’s starting point of January 4, 1999:
Would the EU nations be able to overcome the formidable political
and economic barriers to establishing a single currency on schedule, and
covering most member states? Although there were ample reasons for
skepticism, we now know that the answer was a resounding yes. This
achievement should not be belittled. As late as 1997, there were plenty of
doubters.
Would the mechanics of launching the euro be handled smoothly? As
Corsetti and Pesenti observe, the answer here was another resounding
yes. The euro’s birth posed many serious challenges to both the private and
the public sectors, and both acquitted themselves admirably. This achieve-
ment, too, should not be underestimated. But it is not the sort of issue
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that economists normally sink their teeth into, for it is about making the
ﬁnancial plumbing work, not designing it.
The remaining six questions are more strictly economic in nature, and
the paper deals with all of them.
Would the euro appreciate rapidly after its launch? A number of
observers believed that it would.
1 But we now know that it did not. Instead,
it depreciated sharply from $1.18 in early January to barely over $1.01 in
mid-July. Why? There is, of course, no single answer, but I agree with
Corsetti and Pesenti that the starkly different macroeconomic conditions in
the United States and Europe played the central role.
2 The U.S. economy
has been surging while the economy of Euroland has been listless. Corsetti
and Pesenti’s figure 3 shows the euro sinking just as the relative macro-
economic outlook for Europe deteriorated—although both lines closely
resemble declining time trends.
There is a lesson here for textbook writers and teachers (including
myself), but not for market participants, who already know it well. Text-
book presentations that focus on trade in goods and services emphasize
that when a country grows faster than its trading partners, it imports more,
and this pushes its trade balance into the red and makes its currency depre-
ciate. But the reality is starkly different in the modern, capital account–
dominated world. The more buoyant economy is likely to attract more
internationally mobile capital seeking high returns, which makes the cur-
rency appreciate.
Corsetti and Pesenti get this right, noting also that the euro’s slide
stopped only when some glimmers of macroeconomic hope for Europe
finally started to emerge around mid-July. I do, however, take issue with
their claim that the euro’s fall “appears as the mirror image of the synthetic
euro’s strong appreciation in 1998.” Look at their exchange rate chart for
the euro against the dollar (ﬁgure 2). It shows the synthetic euro moving up
and down in a trading range from about $1.12 to about $1.40 during
1990–96, but distinctly weaker after January 1997. In fact, first the syn-
thetic and now the actual euro has spent almost all of the time since mid-
1997 below the lower bound of its earlier trading range. The remarkable
cyclical strength of the U.S. economy since 1996 may explain this cur-
1. See, among others, Bergsten (1997). 
2. However, macroeconomic conditions are even weaker in Japan, and yet the euro has
also depreciated against the yen.
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rency adjustment, too. But the data do not support Corsetti and Pesenti’s
suggestion that what was unusual was how high the euro climbed in late
1998 rather than how low it fell in the summer of 1999.
Would the new European Central Bank try to out-bubba the Bundes-
bank? There were reasons to worry that it might, thereby starting EMU
off with an excessively tight monetary policy. First, and perhaps foremost,
as a new institution with no track record and many non-Teutonic mem-
bers, the ECB would have to show its teeth. Second, it would have to
nurture a brand new currency, which some observers thought was born
prematurely and might be in for a tumultuous early childhood. Third, the
Maastricht Treaty gives the ECB a lexicographic ordering of goals: price
stability über alles. And fourth, the ECB is, in effect, the first central bank
in history with no national government to report to, and I think we all
believe that politicians are usually less inflation-hawkish than central
bankers.
But the early returns suggest that this fear was exaggerated. The ECB’s
first, and to this point only,
3 monetary action was a surprisingly aggres-
sive interest rate cut in April 1999. Even before that, what we might call
the “synthetic ECB” organized a coordinated rate cut in December 1998.
And policymakers in Frankfurt did not lift a finger as its weak baby, the
euro, fell toward parity with the U.S. dollar. Indeed, they barely uttered a
word until the euro fell below $1.03. Like Corsetti and Pesenti, I take cheer
from these developments. A “monetary conditions index” for Euroland, if
one existed, would depict an aggressively easing central bank in its early
days—which is just what the macroeconomic doctor ordered for Europe.
As macroeconomic tuners, whether fine or coarse, the ECB Governing
Council is off to a pretty good start. But I emphasize once again that it is
awfully early to pass judgment.
Who will manage the exchange rates between the euro and other major
currencies? As Corsetti and Pesenti note, Article 109 of the Maastricht
Treaty is famously vague about how exchange rate policy will be handled
in Stage Three of EMU. The political authorities, in the form of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, “may formulate general orientations for exchange rate
policy” and enter into exchange rate arrangements, including setting cen-
tral parities. The treaty goes on to say that “these general orientations shall
3. As Corsetti and Pesenti note in their addendum, about two months after the September
Brookings Panel meeting, the ECB raised interest rates by 50 basis points.
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be without prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain
price stability.”
4 We all know, however, that in a world where sterilized
interventions have limited power, exchange rate policy and monetary pol-
icy are inextricably intertwined.
However illogical it may sound to economists, assigning exchange rate
policy to the ministers and monetary policy to the ECB is not very differ-
ent from what we do in the United States. The Treasury—in consultation
with the Federal Reserve, of course—decides on exchange rate policy
(sterilized intervention), and the Fed has complete control over monetary
policy. This division of labor does open the door to potential inconsisten-
cies; for example, the Treasury might want to boost the dollar at a time
when the Fed is cutting interest rates. But with consultation and a reason-
able amount of cooperation, such conflicts should be minimal—and
mostly have been so in the United States. In the event of an irreconcilable
difference, the Fed holds the trump card, namely, interest rates.
Much the same should be true in Euroland, but with this important
twist: there is one central bank, but there are eleven finance ministers.
Especially since foreign currency interventions are often arranged on short
notice via international phone calls, this raises the old question posed by
Henry Kissinger: “If I want to talk to Europe, whom do I call?” Mr. Sum-
mers and Mr. Miyazawa may be pondering that now.
So far the Europeans have not seen ﬁt to intervene in the currency mar-
kets—despite being sorely tested by the sinking euro. So we will all just
have to wait and see how things work out. It could be that they will be
less concerned with the exchange rate than many people feared.
How serious will asymmetric shocks be in Euroland, and how will the
ECB cope with them? To many Americans, this was the big question about
the advisability of EMU in the first place. And it remains open. Corsetti
and Pesenti have several interesting thoughts on this issue, which I sum-
marize into two.
First, they observe that the closer financial integration that EMU will
doubtless foster may transform Euroland into something approximating an
optimum currency zone, even though it is not one today. That is certainly
possible. But I am skeptical that ﬁnancial homogenization will bring about
greater real homogenization—or even that it should be expected to do so.
4. These quotes from the treaty are from Szasz (1999, p. 151).
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Texas and New York, to take two U.S. states not at random, share a totally
integrated national financial market. But they hardly share a common
industrial structure, and their business cycles frequently diverge. Indeed,
trade theory would suggest that the single market should actually foster
greater specialization in Europe, as we see in the United States, and hence
greater vulnerability to asymmetric shocks.
Second, the authors note that different monetary transmission mecha-
nisms in different countries can be as nettlesome to the ECB as different
shocks. What if, for example, tighter money hits much harder or much
faster in Italy than in Spain? After reviewing the relevant theoretical and
empirical literature on the monetary transmission mechanism in Europe,
they conclude—intriguingly—that some of the cross-country differences
may be offsetting. But their main conclusion is that “it is difﬁcult to assess
the practical relevance of these considerations.” They are right. We will
just have to wait for some experience.
I would like to add a third important element to the asymmetry discus-
sion. We must remember that eleven of the seventeen votes on the ECB
Governing Council come from national representatives.
5 A crucial ques-
tion is whether, when push comes to shove and national political pres-
sures mount, the eleven central bank governors will vote for the policy that
is best for Euroland, or each for the policy that is best for his or her own
country. So far, the news out of Frankfurt is good: ECBers seem to be
behaving like Europeans. But life at a central bank is (comparatively)
easy when rates are going down. The crucial test will come when, say, con-
ditions in Italy call for stimulus while conditions in Germany call for tight-
ening.
6 The ECB has not been through a stress test yet. So, in sum, the
answer to this question is, Who knows?
Will monetary union eliminate inflation and price differentials in
Euroland? Corsetti and Pesenti’s figure 4 shows that not much has hap-
pened to inflation differentials since the euro was launched. But that is a
negligible time period. It is worth noting, however, because Europeans
5. On the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve, the corresponding
numbers are ﬁve regional bank presidents out of twelve total votes.
6. Much attention was lavished on the cyclical divergences that existed at the euro’s
birth: a fast-growing periphery (Finland, Ireland, Spain) versus a slow-growing core. But the
real test will come when at least one of the three big countries (France, Germany, and Italy)
falls out of step with the other two.
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often forget, that a single currency should equalize inflation rates only in
tradable goods. If, say, Spain is hot and Germany is cold, we would expect
inflation in housing prices and the prices of other nontradables to
diverge—with Spain’s overall inflation rate higher than Germany’s. After
all, no one thinks the prices of houses and restaurant meals should rise at
the same rate in Silicon Valley and the Ohio Valley. To take a concrete
example from the United States: the consumer price index for New York
City rose 77 percent from its 1982–84 base to July 1999, while that for
Dallas–Fort Worth rose just 58 percent. That is an inﬂation differential of
almost 
3⁄4 percentage point per year, compounded for sixteen years.
Moving from inflation rates to price levels, proponents of monetary
union in Europe often argued that a single currency would promote much
greater “price transparency,” which would in turn enhance competition and
drive prices down. It is, of course, too soon to know if this is happening
in Europe now, but I have long been skeptical. For one thing, is it really
that hard to compare the deutsche mark price for a Mercedes at a dealer
in Stuttgart with the franc price at a dealer in Strasbourg? Don’t they have
calculators in Europe? Furthermore, surprisingly large price differences
for exactly the same product exist even within geographically small mar-
kets that use a single currency—such as New York City. Why, then, should
we expect the use of a common currency to obliterate price differences
across eleven countries?
My last question can be posed either normatively or positively:
How transparent should or will the ECB be? At several points, Corsetti
and Pesenti allude to a raging debate in Europe over whether the ECB is
being unnecessarily opaque.
7 I have been a hawk on central bank trans-
parency
8—and was even while I was a central banker.
9 Economically, I
believe greater transparency makes monetary policy work better. Politi-
cally, I believe central bankers owe transparency to the electorate in return
for their grant of independent power. Except where proprietary informa-
tion is involved, my general maxim on transparency is, The more, the mer-
rier. Still, I would be inclined to cut the ECB some slack and not grade
their performance to date too harshly, for several reasons.
7. For a sharp criticism of the ECB, see Willem Buiter (1999b). For a defense, see
Issing (1999b).
8. See Blinder (1998), especially chapter 3.
9. See Blinder (1995).
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dition—and especially not at the Bundesbank, on which the ECB was
modeled. Among the ECB’s first tasks was to assure the German, Dutch,
and other publics that their new central bank would look and act much like
their old ones. We ought to give the ECB some time to step out of the
long shadow of the Bundesbank, and it seems to be doing that a bit. For
example, the ECB is already more explicit about its inﬂation objective than
the Fed is or the Bundesbank ever was.
Second, we should remember that the ECB is the new kid on the central
banking block. It is naturally still feeling its way around, learning to do
its job. Unless its leaders are superhuman, they will make mistakes.
10 Now,
no central banker likes to air his or her mistakes in public; it contradicts the
cherished notion of central bank infallibility. And publicly airing too many
embarrassing errors too soon would likely undermine the ECB’s credibil-
ity. Bismarck once famously declared that you should never see sausages
being made. I would not necessarily apply that adage to monetary policy
decisions, but I do think critics should at least wait until construction of the
sausage factory is complete.
In any case, to my mind, this should be but a temporary reprieve. The
ECB should become more open and transparent as it matures. Only time
will tell if it will.
The attentive reader will have no doubt observed a pattern here. Once
we note that the euro started on time, with eleven participating countries
and no serious glitches, and then depreciated sharply, none of the remain-
ing questions are even remotely close to being answerable with the scant
evidence at hand. Corsetti and Pesenti will have to rewrite this paper in a
few years. Having seen their fine first draft, I look forward to reading the
revision.
General discussion: Richard Cooper found it misleading to represent
achievement of the 1999 startup date as an accomplishment, since that was
the latest date permitted by the Maastricht Treaty for the launch of the
euro. Any further delay would have created a constitutional crisis with
unclear consequences. The original plan had been to launch the euro in
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already a mistake.
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fastest-growing part of the European economy. Expectations ten to twenty
years ago, particularly in the French academic community, had been that
the periphery would inevitably lag behind the center. He also noted that
continental Europe traditionally had a strong primary market and a very
weak secondary market in government bonds, and he wondered whether
a stronger secondary market was emerging with the euro now in place
and whether euro debt instruments were being held abroad. 
Laurence Ball found the paper’s positive view of the onset of EMU pre-
mature. He granted that the launch of the common currency had gone
smoothly, but he saw little evidence yet of beneficial developments from
the euro’s introduction, and he questioned the assertion that market inte-
gration in Europe had exceeded expectations. Christopher Sims suggested
that problems could arise from the divorce between fiscal and monetary
authority. He was troubled by what might happen if it became necessary to
bail out a large private corporation or bank; the funds required for such a
bailout might amount to a nontrivial share of a country’s budget. Such
bailouts have fiscal implications, and the EMU’s connection to fiscal
authorities remains unclear. Sims noted that a true lender of last resort
must have the ability to print money, and the only institution that can now
do so is the European Central Bank. At the same time, a lender of last
resort must enforce conditions that minimize moral hazard, yet bank reg-
ulation remains a national function with no apparent connection to EMU.
Sims also questioned the paper’s analysis of how contractionary interest
rate increases by the ECB could handle a crisis of a depreciating euro. He
argued that an interest rate rise is contractionary only if the ﬁscal authori-
ties are committed to making the tax increases and expenditure cuts
needed to cover the fiscal costs of higher rates. Thus the ECB’s ability to
defend the euro will depend on people believing in such a fiscal commit-
ment. But under current institutional arrangements in Europe, it is unclear
whether people would hold that belief.
Bradford DeLong addressed Alan Blinder’s question about how the
national representatives would vote on the ECB board. He reasoned they
would become ambassadors of the bank to the member states, explaining
to their home countries why the ECB’s monetary policy should be
accepted without complaint, rather than ambassadors of the home coun-
tries to the ECB, demanding that the bank act to suit their national inter-
ests. He noted that the original idea behind regional Federal Reserve Banks
366 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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the years a central banker culture has overwhelmingly taken over at the
Fed. In a similar vein, William Dickens reasoned that the present lack of
transparency at the ECB might need to be made permanent. Many of the
ECB’s internal debates will be on labor market and fiscal policy issues,
with frequent comparisons across member states, and publicly airing such
deliberations might be politically damaging.
On the question of whether the euro would lead to convergence in price
levels and inflation rates across member states, Susan Collins referred to
the literature on cross-country price differentials of traded goods that asks
“how wide is the border?” This literature finds that international borders
matter a lot, in that price differentials between two cities within the same
country tend to be small relative to price differentials between cities of
similar distance apart that are separated by a border. She noted that EMU
would test whether currency differences contributed to this effect, and
she suspected it might shrink but not eliminate it.
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